{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":60,"pdf_page":64,"physical_index":64,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"30fa98c08cdc2b26126a5561c966d51f32644e8925fab3ac7295d7cc8f2b4a68"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"at-an-end [zu -end - Sein]而不是being-towards- end [Sein zum Ende]。对于海德格尔来说，这些死亡的概念与目的的概念一起运作，它取代了目的已经一直存在的事实，因此，此在的理解能力成为一个整体，可以说，已经总是由理解能力成为一个整体构成的。他把此在的“尚未”比作一块成熟的水果，他认为“……只要任何此在存在，它就已经是“尚未”了。”78海德格尔从未使用过这个词，但这里有一个隐含的总体化的概念正在发展，这样，朝向死亡的存在就是总体化的，因为它不是，也不可能是一个总体(在这个词的普通或所谓的先验意义上)。这也是海德格尔关于死亡和终点的概念与特定的极限概念相吻合的独特方式[Grenze]。79正如怀特解释的那样，“我们感兴趣的是为什么以及如何限制可能性”，80，“死亡描绘并界定了此在作为一个可理解的将来的可能性”。’81或者，正如布拉特纳所说，这是一种限制的情况，在这种情况下，将来’的能力被扼杀了。82死亡的概念适合于作为其可能性的实体，是这些可能性的基本限制，但这是一种什么样的限制呢？\n\n这里有一个复杂的哲学挪用，是关于这个限制的概念谱系的。正如海德格尔通过他的世界概念重建先验综合判断的纯净性一样，这种挪用始于康德，尽管它与走向死亡的存在的关系源于(对海德格尔来说)柏拉图和亚里士多德对整体和总和的不发达的区别。83有不同但重叠的维度来\n\n78 Ibid. 288. .the “lack of totality in Dasein, the constant “ahead-of-itself\", is neither something still outtanding in a summative togetherness, nor something which has not yet become accessible. It is a“notyet\" which any Dasein, as the entity which it is, has to be.' Ibid.\n\n79 As we will examine, this is also the unique manner in which Heidegger ties temporalisation to the basic teleological structure of action by way of the concept of finitude [Endlichkeit], that characteristic of temporalisation itself (ibid. 378). It is the limit -qua the finitude of temporality -which secures beingtowards-death as the existential ground of temporalisation.\n\n80 White, 'Dasein, Existence, and Death', 338.\n\n81 Carol J. White, Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2005), 79.\n\n82 William Blattner, ‘The Concept of Death in Being and Time’ , in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), 325. Blattner stresses the centrality of anxiety [Àngst] to Heidegger' s analysis of death, although in a very curious fashion. On his reading, anxiety is not a disposedness in line with anticipatory being-towards-death, as Heidegger argues, but death as such. In other words, Blattner expresses the idea that death is actually a possible way to be Dasein (in which Dasein is unable to be). Death, it seems, is akin to an anxiety attack. It is a state in which the ability-to-be is stifled. His metaphor for this is as follows: in the absence of light, the ability-to-see is not non-existent, it is simply stifled.\" Ibid. To Blattner’ s credit, he carefully reconstructs Heidegger’ s nuanced understanding of the end, drawing on Jasper’ s concept of the limit-situation, in order to evade any sense of the end as ‘stopping' . However, his idea that death is a situation that occurs when Dasein is beset by anxiety, in which none of its possibilities matter to it whatsoever, does little else but flatten the crucial importance of anticipation.\n\n83 Heidegger, BT, 288, ft. iii (494).\n\n60","previous_page":59,"next_page":61}