{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":61,"pdf_page":65,"physical_index":65,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"4fa08e8eb36c8746431715d33a80df094dafc0ee1a7bcc679ab70356b8f99617"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"这种挪用，其共同的起源是康德批判哲学中界限和障碍的系统区分。对康德来说，“界限……总是预设了一个在某个固定地点之外发现的空间，并且这个空间包围了那个地点;障碍不需要这类东西，而仅仅是影响一个量级的否定，因为它不具备绝对的完整性。84与数学和自然科学不同，形而上学内部的“纯粹理性的辩证努力”导致了一些界限，这些界限的逾越(作为先验观念)“无法避免，但永远不会实现”。85在海德格尔的著作《世界观心理学》(1919)中，通过克尔凯郭尔的焦虑概念和贾斯帕的“极限情境”(Grenzsituation)概念，海德格尔对其进行了脚注。86具体地说，它是向内在的存在走向终点，这样的焦虑“相当于揭示此在作为被抛向终点的存在而存在的事实”87，它存在地记录了死亡的不可避免性和实际的不可能性。换句话说，存在内在的对死亡的焦虑，与康德的极限的功能相对应，但又批判性地改变了它:与之对应，因为引起这种焦虑的极限(死亡)是确定的，但又是不可实现的;批判性地修正，因为在海德格尔中，对这一界限的越界永远只是一种走向极限的存在，这样焦虑就不会在时空的现象领域之外产生，而只是永远存在于世界本身。88因此，与康德的先验观念相反，走向死亡的存在不是虚幻的或欺骗性的(至少，也就是说，在它的“真实”模式中)。\n\n这种将越界作为预期的重新编码——这种将越界作为所谓的“走向极限的存在”的重新加工——构成了海德格尔对死亡分析中最重要的段落的背景：\n\n作为一种可能性，对死亡最接近的存在，是尽可能远离任何实际的东西。对这种可能性的理解越不加掩饰，这种理解就越纯粹地将其渗透为任何存在的不可能的可能性[<s:1>berhaupt]。死亡，作为可能性，没有给予此在任何可以“实现”的东西，也没有给予此在作为现实的东西本身所能存在的东西。它是与任何事物相对应的每一种方式、每一种存在方式的不可能性的可能性。在对这种可能性的预期中，它变得“越来越大”;也可能性表现为这样一种情况:它根本不知道尺度，不多也不少，而是意味着存在的无限的不可能性的可能性。 89\n\n84 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science [1783], trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 103-4 (§ 57). Translation modified to register Grenzen as limits' and Schranken as barriers’\n\n85 Ibid. 104.\n\n86 Heidegger, BT, 293, ft. vi (494-95). See also William Blattner, Heidegger’ s Debt to Jasper’ s Concept of the Limit-Situation’ , in Heidegger and Jaspers, ed. Alan M. Olson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 153-65.\n\n87 Heidegger, BT, 295. Emphasis in the original.\n\n88 'That in the face of which there is anxiety is being-in-the-world as such.' Heidegger, SZ, 247 (BT, 230).\n\n61","previous_page":60,"next_page":62}