{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":62,"pdf_page":66,"physical_index":66,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8d7db53142449b8db6e291445b20c9db4f8717bed2ea2284ccbbacc9dd11a797"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"这篇文章运用了极限的双重概念。一方面，死亡是一切限制的限制:这个限制本身，是构成理解的每一个限制的集体的单一的限制(构成构成每一个未来能力的每一个限制的本体论基础的未来能力的限制)。作为此在的最纯粹和最真实的可能性，这是死亡的意义，作为每一个有限经验的众多中的绝对限制。就此而言，“任何存在都不可能存在的可能性”就是完全不存在的可能性，是完全不存在的可能性。另一方面，这段话的核心有一种激进的情境性，这样，每一个行为都是由一个特定于该行为的限制所构成的存在性结构。这个限制不是死亡，而是存在的战术领域一一走向死亡。这样的限制(死亡)在本体论上为每一个行为的限制的专一性奠定了基础，但它之所以这样做，只是因为每一个行为的限制有一种专一性一一一种事实性。因此，\"任何存在都不可能存在的可能性\"也表明了一个简单的事实，即此在不可能以任何特定的方式存在(这在\"任何与任何事物相对应的方式，任何存在的方式都不可能存在的可能性\"的双重意义中同样是显而易见的)。每一行为都是由一种特定于该行为的限制所构成的，因此，此在不可能是一一也不可能是一一任何存在。这个极限的维度是海德格尔后来对“预期的决定论”的分析的核心，其中，决定论“恰恰是当时在理论上可能的事物的揭示性投射和决定”，通过它，此在成为整体的能力具有“存在的真实性”。作为走向死亡的存在，此在所不能成为的东西是没有尺度的:既没有尺度到它不能避免但它永远不能实现的极限(死亡)，也没有尺度到构造每一个行为的策略极限。此在成为整体的能力的可能性的本体论意义包含了存在的这两种无限的不可能性9\n\n89 Heidegger, SZ, 348. The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of this passage (Heidegger, BT, 306-7) includes a one’ (The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility'') and a oneself (the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything') which, as previously mentioned (footnote 51), effectively compels the English-language reader to grasp Dasein as already and only an individual entity, and as already and only an individual person at that.\n\n90 Heidegger, BT, 345. This analysis of resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] figures conscience as the call’ of care, whereby an appeal is made -from Dasein to Dasein -to summon’ it out of its fall into the one and towards itsownmost ability-to-be’. Heidegger, SZ, 369 (BT, 322).\n\n91 At the end of her analysis of Heidegger’ s conception of death, White points out that the prefix Un’ of Unmöglichkeit (impossibility) denotes both excessive amount' as well as non/not' . She advances the notion that Heidegger might be playing with a doubled meaning of Unmöglichkeit, and that, in the anticipation of death, what is measureless' about the measureless impossibility of existence is both\n\n62","previous_page":61,"next_page":63}