{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":63,"pdf_page":67,"physical_index":67,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8d6cd5ec5baf33ec49289b51cd36a3491c3eaa412d8f0c6eb4cbafcc4c9a3581"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"我们现在要评论海德格尔对死亡的终极定义。按照他的呈现顺序，死亡完全是:此在的最高可能性，它是非相关的(unbezgliche)、不可超越的(unberholbar)、确定的(gewi)和不确定的(unbestimmt)。92这些维度的每一个基础都是海德格尔所说的此在之死的“在每一种情况下的我性”(jeemeinigkeit)，在约翰·豪格兰(JohnHaugeland)之后，它表明，在走向死亡的存在中，不是此在本身是“我的”，而是此在在每一个别情况下都是“我的”。界限的概念在多大程度上通过每一个维度交织在一起是很明显的。然而，这个死亡概念也有一个同样明显的哲学问题，这个问题不是由极限概念本身引起的，而是由作为走向死亡之存在的基础的极限的特殊的个体化特征引起的。这是此在的原始社会性(与有在和有在的同等原始存在性)为走向死亡的存在所构成的充分证明的问题。对列维纳斯来说，海德格尔的“走向死亡的存在”的个体化结构忽略了对他者责任的伦理的、非衍生的结构，这种结构产生了“一个我可以因某人而死并为某人而死的世界”。94对于Ricoeur来说，海德格尔对死亡分析的核心的“内在主义倾向”从我们的视线中隐藏了“世界视界”的全部范围。95有可能通过某些段落中固有的模糊性来减轻这些批评。例如，当海德格尔说“死亡要求它[此在]作为一个个体的此在”96时，重要的是要记住，这个“个体”的确切轮廓是什么是不清楚的，因为，如前所述，此在的个体化意味着此在与其他实体领域的界限，至少不是\n\nthe non- and excessive possibility of existence. If Heidegger is in fact invoking Unmöglichkeit in this doubled sense, it is possible to suggest that death erases any measure to possibility both within and outside the limit, thus grounding the ontological importance of the limit. See White, 'Dasein, Existence, and Death' , 342.\n\n92 Heidegger, SZ, 349-52 (BT, 307-10).\n\n93 Haugeland, Truth and Finitude: Heidegger' s Transcendental Existentialism' , 62. As previously indicated (see footnote 47), this specification of Jemeinigkeit adds weight to the idea that Dasein is not already always a human individual, that there is, in other words, a unique and separate Dasein for each individual person.\n\n94 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority [1961], trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 239.\n\n95 Riceur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 295, ft. 38. Consider Ricœur’ s comment in light of the fact that the horizon' (from the Greek horizein) is that which limits, surrounds and encloses. Simon Critchley’ s insistence on the fundamentally relational character of finitude’ qua theoriginary inauthenticity' of death is a thought-provoking but ultimately unconvincing reworking of Heidegger, because it strips all existentiality away from Heidegger' s explicitly existential conception of death, and because the novelty of his originary inauthenticity' is premised on the notion that authenticity is the exclusive domain of the origin in Being and Time, which is simply untrue [ursprüngliche ≠eigentliche]. See Simon Critchley, Originary Inauthenticity -on Heidegger' s Sein und Zeit' , in Simon Critchley and Reiner Schürmann, On Heidegger's Being and Time, ed. Steven Levine (London: Routledge, 2008), 144.\n\n96 Heidegger, BT, 308.\n\n63","previous_page":62,"next_page":64}