{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":65,"pdf_page":69,"physical_index":69,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"604a599fc1f019aee62d7902c074a5ded65406c83d8116624bf300c1a5281030"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"此在是从一般存在的意义问题出发的。它还将“本体论差异”重新定义为此在与其他实体领域之间的差异，而不是存在与实体本身之间的差异。海德格尔很清楚，本体论的差异不仅仅是差异本身，而是不同事物之间的关系。因此，就历史差异而言，本体论差异(当然，马克思从未使用过这个概念)也必须表示一种生产方式与另一种生产方式之间的差异，这样，每一种生产方式产生不同的时间，因为它产生不同的此在，并产生了另一种此在，因为它产生了另一种时间。这就是与马克思关于前面提到的“历史存在”的对话可能会变成的样子:不是一种将时间性作为实体的对话，102而是一种将时间性时间化的对话，因为—一就像此在一样—一它架起了本体论-本体论的鸿沟。与海德格尔相反，在这个意义上，时间性只是因为它具有物质性而被时间化了。这不仅仅是物质的时间性，而且是通过劳动的活时间形成物质的时间性。 103\n\n然而，尽管它是在反社会个人的层面上构成的，但在海德格尔(而不是马克思)那里，我们必须注意到时间化的必要方面。这是《存在与时间》的前提，即存在在本体论上优先于真性和堕落，可能性作为一种存在性，是此在在本体论上被规定的最原始的和最终的肯定的方式。104也就是说，我们从海德格尔那里获得了一种本体论上的优先权，赋予未来(die Zukunft)于过去和现在之上，也就是说，他坚信“时间性最初是在未来之外将自身时间化的”。105正是未来，不是作为尚未到来的东西，而是作为知性将来能力的存在-本体论意义，最终决定了“已性”(Gewesenheit)，即事实性的时间性，以及“制造现在”(Gegenwart)，即坠落的时间性。这并不是要忽略过去和现在106作为时间性的原始狂喜[Ekstasen，源自古希腊的ekstasis或ν κστασι]。相反，它是去面对(这伴随着它的条件而来)\n\n101 Osborne, The Politics of Time: odernity nd Avant-Garde, 56. Exposing being as such’ or being in general’ [Sein überhaupt] as ahistorical' is more complex than might be, assumed, as it depends on creating a concept of the ahistorical' out of a concept of the 'historical act' which both deviates from Heidegger and is not synonymous with situating this act inits specific time and place’ (historicism).\n\n102 Reiterating Heidegger' s position in the Leibniz lectures (footnote 100): Temporality “is” not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalises itself.' Heidegger, BT, 377.\n\n103 As cited in the previous chapter: Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living time.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 361.\n\n104 Heidegger, SZ, 191 (BT, 183).\n\n105 Heidegger, SZ, 438 (BT, 380).\n\n106 Whilst this thesis utilises the terms the past' and the present' in conjunction with facticity/beenness and falling/making present, it must be noted that Heidegger relegates the past' to an entity which is no longer present-at-hand, and the present' to the levelling off of the significance of now-time' . The future is the only coordinate of time which keeps its everyday name in Being and Time.\n\n65","previous_page":64,"next_page":66}