{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":66,"pdf_page":70,"physical_index":70,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"738aef2bbdc7680f81b90cafc96a20233f14bcb761e7ab40af376299dc25e426"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"唯物主义的历史观与海德格尔将时间性定义为“在已经存在的过程中创造现在的未来的统一”。107.从这个角度来看，马克思和恩格斯的“第一个历史行为”的未来是原创的，因为“曾经存在的特征”由此产生，因为作为一个在曾经存在的过程中的未来，它“从自身中解脱出来”并“唤醒”作为现在和作为在场的现在的存在。108作为一种狂喜，第一个历史行为的未来站在自身之外，因为它已经超前于自身，而这种过剩，这种本质的剩余，构成了它的原始力量的基础。第一个历史行动的未来使这一行动总体化，以致现在和过去之间的差别被一种理解——一种投射能力——统一起来，任何行动都是为了这种理解而存在的109\n\n走向死亡的存在确保了此在成为整体的能力的可能性，但在什么意义上它确保了作为这种可能性的本体论意义的时间性?对于海德格尔来说，这个问题的答案是存在的有限性(Endlichkeit)，通过这个问题，死亡和暂时是不可分割地联系在一起的。Endlichkeit中的“终点”并不是“它[此在]恰好停止的终点”，而是如前所述，是“时间化本身的特征”。110这就是目的论和目的论对于存在和时间的关键(如果很大程度上unacknowledged111)重要的话)。简单地说，行为的目的论结构是海德格尔分析死亡和时间性的立足点。这种结构明确地不是一般的总体性和时间性解释的结构。对海德格尔来说，走向终点的存在的“终点”是目的论的终点，而不是时间顺序的终点。目的论的终结不能与时间顺序的终结混为一谈。相反，目的论目的是思考时间顺序目的的条件，因此，原始的时间性是思考庸俗的时间概念的条件。正如陶德·梅所言：“时间(过去、现在、未来)的狂喜，把目的或为了目的的特征，表现为一种由于存在的时间性而不断被唤起的目的。这是有限性的反思性负担，有限性在理解一个目的时，只能通过不断的本体论运动来实现它，而这种运动永远不会最终到达那里。这种有限性规定了这一点\n\n107Heidegger, BT, 374. Emphasis added.\n\n108 Ibid. 374, 375, 378. On the doubled meaning of the German Gegenwart, see footnote 17. 109 Ibid. 385.\n\n110 Ibid. 378.\n\n11Curiously, Heidegger does not openly acknowledge the fact that his rethinking of telos and teleology are at the heart of the project which is Being and Time. As we will investigate, this rethinking calls into question the relationship between action (the Greek ergon [ργyov]) and praxis [πρξι] more broadly. Take, for instance, his 1924 lectures on Aristotle, in which praxis is the ontological specification of action:we know that the being of human beings is determined in its ρyovas πρξiç. This has telos [τλo] in itself, comes to its end through itself.’ Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Áristotelian Philosophy [1924], trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 123 (§ 17).\n\n112 Todd Mei, Heidegger, Work and Being (London: Continuum, 2009), 125.\n\n66","previous_page":65,"next_page":67}