{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":68,"pdf_page":72,"physical_index":72,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"bf37923f366c82fa2512782e5ca9eec6254778dbebf1fa3831517f4faf569c63"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"关于这个图有几点注意。首先，它将海德格尔所说的“衍生时间”（其中未来的优先权仍然存在)115转化为一种延伸到整个存在与时间的衍生逻辑。这是一种存在性推导的三方结构，其模型是将原始的时间性“退化”为世界时间，将世界时间“退化”为普通时间116，但作为一种结构，它不能约化为时间。其次，为了忠实于(目前)海德格尔，在这个图中推导的垂直和层次方向最好是在一个水平的和非评价的平面上进行想象，这与时间(原始的时间性、世界时间和普通时间)是对存在的“任何理解”的先验视界的观念是一致的。117因此，真实性和非真实性被书写在整个结构中。原始的时间性并不是真实的时间性的唯一领域;即，原始时间性≠真实时间性。在Blattner之后，《存在与时间》中的原始时间性对真实性和非真实性是“模态无关的”：“真实的时间性仅仅是原始时间性的一种模态。”118因此，世界时间和普通时间并不一定是非真实的。严格地说，世界时间和普通时间可以被认为是此在的“自身”，从而成为“一”的一种存在性的修正，“一”为他自己解放了他者。119相反，原来的时间性反复在“一”中迷失自己，完全被“世界”和在“一”中与他人在一起的本我所吸引。120对于海德格尔来说，一种时间形式和一种存在模式之间的约束同一性，一种固定的同一性，比如说，在普通时间和非真实性之间，扁平化了本体论和本体论之间的本质区别，因为它固定了—一绝对化了—一在在与自身存在的关系。但是，如何解释一种时间形式与一种存在模式之间的趋同呢?是什么中介了他们的关系，就像海德格尔所说的，\n\n115 Heidegger, BT, 378.\n\n116 William Blattner, Temporality' , in A Companion To Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Bļackwell, 2005), 318. See Heidegger, BT, 383, where degeneration is linked to the notion of ‘springing-from’\n\n117 Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being.’ Ibid. 19. This is an understanding of time as that which exceeds and transgresses (from the Latin transcendere) as well, as previously mentioned, as limits, surrounds and encloses (from the Greek horizein). This is Dasein as a transcendental horizon' : Dasein' s selfhood does not imply a substantial centre from which the transcending movement is supposed to start, but is, on the coņtrary, founded upon transcendence itself -as the condition of its very possibility.' Françoise Dastur,The Ekstatico-Horizonal Constitution of Temporality' , in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1, Philosophy, ed. Christopher Macann (London; Routledge, 1992), 174. Heidegger' s transcendental horizon is indebted to the temporalising structure of transcendence in immanence\" in Husserlian phenomenology, from which Nancy’ s idea of art as 'transimmanence’ equally departs. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses [1994], trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 34-5.\n\n118 Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, 99.\n\n119 Heidegger, BT, 168, 159.\n\n120 Ibid. 220.\n\n68","previous_page":67,"next_page":69}