{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":69,"pdf_page":73,"physical_index":73,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"43e9b2f97fc0b37b5a44b3cde5a1c0ddf8be7bf8c62ebb62a8fc395e47bc618c"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"一种“原始而真实的时间”和一种“普通而不真实的时间”?原始与真实、普通与非真实之间的时间关系具有变化能力，我们如何解释这一事实?海德格尔没有解决的这些问题刷新了《存在与时间》中本体论和本体论之间关系的更大问题，因为此在是本体论的，所以它是“本体论的独特的”，这一事实只会加剧这个问题。\n\n这些问题为研究唯物主义历史概念如何将海德格尔对行为的解构问题化奠定了基础，这一研究的起源与《存在与时间》中的起源问题(Ursprung)趋同。sch<s:1>rmann的著作是关键的出发点。它表明，思想与行动之间的经典关系在海德格尔那里本质上是颠倒的:传统上由思想承担的斗篷转移到了行动上。对于sch海德格尔来说，这种倒置不仅仅是在行动中重新审视本体论，而且这样做会使思想和行动之间的任何区别变得无政府，因为海德格尔实践先验的核心张力将起源和原始者从“哲学原则”的限制中释放出来。121 sch<s:1>rmann通过一个复杂的起源谱系来追溯这种释放。首先，他检查了动态概念的因果性和目的性维度，内部定义为对它所产生的事物的开始和支配，并作为目的(telos)的来源，它构建poiêsis(为了产生一个可感知的对象而工作)和实践(作为自身的目的而工作)。然而，他未能识别出archos的基本时间构成:telos提供了时间统一发生的未来立场,这种统一仅作为现在的过去是现实的。archu是过去(起因,开始),然而它是一个只有从它所支配的现在行动中才能理解的过去。122其次,sch<s:1> rmann通过Duns Scotus的《论上帝作为第一原则》和莱布尼茨的《单论论》,将希腊语archue翻译成拉丁语principium。这里的利害关系是，事物产生的“第一”如何不代表被遗忘的时间——正如sch<e:1>曼所坚持的那样——而是固定的时间，一个在过去作为绝对主体的命令下僵化的时间，无论是在赋予基本秩序的原则的形象中，还是在作为逻辑和真理基础的原则的法则中。这一观点的哲学结论是,行动—一尽管仍在时间之内一—不能被视为一个隐含的时间化概念。“在那个时代(拉丁哲学)的末期”，\n\n121 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 95-6. According to Schürmann, this is an ontological, epistemological and historical release which simultaneously sunders the boundaries between ontology, epistemology and history.\n\n122 This is the temporal logic of archē: In Aristotle, where the origin is understood in the context of human making, the elements of inception and of domination in archē balance each other. Production is a becoming over which telos reigns, perceived from the start as archē.' Ibid. 110.\n\n69","previous_page":68,"next_page":70}