{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":70,"pdf_page":74,"physical_index":74,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"df6d26e58c50a2f413375bf0f5e0305b8b5e173d2753f7a37bf20685dd7c347f"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"sch<s:1>rmann指出，“原理变成了心灵的法则……一个由理性构思并作为前提公式化的第一真理。”123对施曼来说，这是海德格尔关于开端(开始)、启始(安方)和本源的概念所拆除的哲学和历史语境。124开始和开始是跨越海德格尔对存在的形而上学的批判性参与的范畴。开端需要一个早期的运动它标志着思维的先决条件，而inception则恢复了被经验抓住并对经验做出反应的前苏格拉底观念，这种观念带来了感觉、言语和思想的动态星座。Ursprung——125年的“原始飞跃”——在现象学上与开始和安方同时存在，但在本体论上先于它们。对于schrmann来说,起源的优先性来自两个共同构成的问题：“本体论”的问题，这是存在与时间的任务；“本体论的起源”的问题,作为事件的存在——以及海德格尔的本体概念—一由此产生126\n\nschrmann方案的问题不在于问题本身，而在于存在与时间在本体论上不能对起源问题负责。这不应该让人感到意外。起源本身并没有在《存在与时间》中被主题化。在第二次划分的开始，本体论解释的“原创性”（与从知性中产生的存在性解释相反)被松散地定义为此在的结构整体的统一性.但这种定义并不能减轻，反而加重了这样一个事实:严格说来，《存在与时间》中并没有行为的概念。此在在现象学上被呈现为时间化的本体论基础，但在任何地方都没有被本体论化为行为和行为。《存在与时间》中行为的本体论概念的缺失，决定了此在的现象学本体论隐含地代表了这个概念，这与《存在与时间》中起源的本体论概念的缺失是同义的。由此产生的后果是多种多样的。首先，它把“同等原创性”的哲学地位[gleichursprnglich]委托给一种描述性的序列性。《存在与时间》是一个系列文本，就像康德的《纯粹理性批判》一样\n\n123 Ibid. 106.\n\n124 ..the task is crucial if acting -life -is to be disengaged from teleocratic as well as principial frameworks; if deconstruction is to set free from beneath archē and principium an origin less compromised by command and domination; and if in the final analysis the question of acting comes down to complying with that more elusive origin.’ Ibid. 121.\n\n125 To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap, -this is what the word origin (German Ürsprung, literally, primal leap) means.' Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art' [1935-6], trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 75.\n\n126 For Schürmann, many of the misunderstandings concerning Heidegger are explainable by the exclusive attention paid to his effort to raise the ontological question originarily, without noting his simultaneous effort to think the origin ontologically.' Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 128-29. Ereignis is a concept of the later Heidegger, after the so-called turn’ [Kehre].\n\n70","previous_page":69,"next_page":71}