{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":72,"pdf_page":76,"physical_index":76,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"064eb0a2a2af0807a0f9759eb69978d7ea78b114660d8ea8e3f874fe19f1cec8"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"历史的重复并不能取代未来的优先，因为只有朝向死亡的存在才使重复成为可能。\n\n本文认为，史实性只会加剧《存在与时间》在本体论上回避行为和起源的问题。对于历史构成的“激进现象学的一个问题”(作为时间的存在)这一不可避免的问题，历史性没有提供任何回应。131作为历史性的历史本身并不是一个“原始的本体论依据”，因此，从存在与时间中构建一个“历史起源”的概念是没有意义的。在存在本体论的层面上，《存在与时间》的原创性是暂时性，而不是历史性。132这与最重要的问题相吻合，正如阿多诺所说，“历史性的结构………只是为自然与历史的和解问题提供了一个明显的解决方案。”133正如引言中所提到的，“走向死亡的真实存在——也就是说，时间性的有限性—一是此在历史性的隐藏基础。”134然而，如果面对死亡的真实存在是非关系的，在每个案例中都是我的——如果对死亡的预期不可避免地是反社会的——那么此在对它根本没有中介的外部性，这样，个人和历史目的之间的差异——个人和历史时间化之间的差异—一就完全扁平化了。在马克思看来，个人和历史的时间性之间的区别是通过自然来中介的，因此，个人行为(从个人的角度来看，生活资料的社会生产)既不是直接的，也不是内在的历史性，而只会导致历史性(历史的个人)，因为它必然是通过自然进行中介的。这很重要，因为它在结构上一一历史上一一证明了历史性不可能是个体时间化的内在维度(尽管海德格尔将历史性限制在个体时间化的工作中)。个人及其历史性必须以一种外在性为中介，而正是这种外在性—一自然的—一在历史上不断变化的特征，在马克思的(不发达的)社会个人概念中脱颖而出。社会个体在马克思中是一个规范的概念:它在历史上是作为它不应该成为的东西而产生的。因此，它与共产主义的历史本体论是不可分离的。在这个意义上，在IstvánMészáros之后，\n\n131 Schürmann, Hęidegger on Being and Acting, 127. The history which constitutes a problem for being as time cannot be the project Heidegger pursues after his Kehre[which] crystallises in the question, how does presencing become history? How does it, as event, condition all that can occur?’ Ibid. The retroactive insertion of a historical origin qua Ereignis into Being and Time is not the answer\n\n132 Heidegger uses the expressions originary happening' (435) and originary historicality’ (438) in Being and Time, but these are strictly confined to the existentiell level of authentic resoluteness and fate.\n\n133 Theodor Adorno, The Idea of Natural-History' ,[1932], trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor, in Tęlos 60 (Summer 1984), 115. For the sake of consistency, historicity' has been replaced by historicality'.\n\n134Heidegger, BT, 438.\n\n72","previous_page":71,"next_page":73}