{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":73,"pdf_page":77,"physical_index":77,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"40bd355978f7eb7f847eef046921e504d09471ca1bd934f5bff89c09d16aad6d"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"只有“真正的”社会个人才能实现人的“完整人格”[Gesamtpersönlichkeit]:“Gesamtpersönlichkeit”的实现必然意味着个性和社会性在社会个人的有形的人类现实中重新融合。13⁵然而，在共产主义中被重新占有的不只是个人的异化力量，还有类似历史性本身的东西，这样个人才第一次成为历史性的：他们把所有以前的历史的本体论地位降为“史前”。在共产主义中，社会个人不仅实现了自己的概念;它也第一次成为一个真正的历史个体。这里的要点是，海德格尔的真实历史性概念将其自身的可能性条件(时间性)去历史化，而马克思的社会个体概念(资本主义)却没有。用施<e:1>曼的话来说，历史性并没有把本源从“哲学原则”的限制中解放出来。最终，海德格尔和施曼无法避免的是阿多诺的指责，即历史性“将历史固定在非历史领域，而不顾支配主体和客体的内在构成和星座的历史条件”。’136\n\n由此引出两点，使我们与海德格尔的对话告一段落。首先，他的历史性概念绕过了出生作为此在不可超越的存在本体论限制的哲学重要性。 137“面向出生的存在”（一个海德格尔从未使用过的新词)并没有被确立为面向-的存在的一个必要方面\n\n135 István Mészros, Marx's Theory of Alienation [1970] (London: Merlin Press, 1986), 269. The problem with Mészáros’ s account is that the social individual as such is conceptually opposed to the isolated individual in capitalism. He does not recognise that the isolated individual in capitalism is a socially isolated individual, no less a social individual than its (speculative) counterpart determined by communism.\n\n136 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics [1966], trans. E.B. Ashton (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 129. The incommensurability between the temporality of Dasein [Zeitlichkeit es Daseins] in Being and Time and the Temporality of Being' [Temporalität des Seins] in Heidegger’ s later work is not unrelated to this. Namely, the analysis of historicality paves the way for attempts to think a transition from Zeitlichkeit to Temporalität. Consider John Sallis' s search for another time\" : the move to an analytic of Temporalität would be an advance to a form of time that would be more originary than the originary time of Dasein. It would be an advance beyond the time that the existential analysis establishes in its identity with Dasein, an advance beyond the time that would be sheltered in what was once called the soul, an advance toward another time.’ John Sallis, 'Another Time’ , in Appropriating Heidegger, ed. James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 183. The search for what Sallis calls uranic time' devolves into mysticism: Could the sheer radiance of the sky, its pure shining, the radiant shining that is the sky, ever be mistaken for something at hand in the narrow human world? Then, neither could the time it gives be assimilated to Dasein' s temporality. And then, one would need to say that the time given by the sky, this uranic time, is, in a way both remote and wondrous, another time.' Ibid. 189.\n\n137 Inspired by Hannah Arendt' s account of natality in The Human Condition (1958) and the category of vita activa (labour, work, action) which underlies this account, Ricœur suggests that…the silence of Being and Time regarding the phenomenon of birth…is surprising. Should not this jubilation be opposed toan obsession of metaphysics with the problem of deathdoes not the anguished obsession with death amount to closing off the reserve of openness characterising the potentiality of being?’ Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting [2000], trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 357.\n\n73","previous_page":72,"next_page":74}