{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":74,"pdf_page":78,"physical_index":78,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b36848fcd625dc6e84c3e5306e245978e4e236a9f8a119e134aa37dcf9084cc4"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"这一限制，就像朝向死亡的存在一样，为此在成为整体的能力的历史性可能性奠定了基础。出生被描述为此在作为整体的能力的另一个“终点”，但它很快就被死亡所包含。138死亡对出生的优先性是由出生与此在生命的“连接性”之间的内在关系所保证的，而死亡(对海德格尔来说)是不可约化为生命的。然而，尽管他经常使用限定性引号，海德格尔并没有发展出“出生”的存在主义概念，具有讽刺意味的是，它排除了一种可能性(与《存在与时间》中的推导逻辑一致)，即出生作为生物繁殖一一因此生物繁殖的时间性一一可能以某种方式出现在此在的现象学本体论中。从极限的观点来看，没有任何意义认为出生构成了类似于死亡的纯粹可能性的“纯粹事实性”;换句话说，也不存在过去可能缓和未来的原始本体论力量的意义。139总的来说，很明显，海德格尔对出生的忽视与他对历史性的分析所代表的起源问题是分不开的。然而，朝向出生的存在的整合并不需要使他对行为的目的论结构的改造无效。没有理由说，行为不能由一个以上的不可超越的限制来构成，这是此在作为整体的能力的可能性的基础。如果说有什么区别的话，那就是诞生为“朝向”增加了一个额外的维度，进一步激进了此在的情境性，进一步巩固了极限的本体论重要性。尽管出生是一种永远无法重新实现的“不可简化的过去可能性”，但它也是一一无论是在生物学上还是在存在主义上一一历史未来的一个原始组成部分。这个目的决定了此在的历史重复的可能性，也就是说，此在可以在本体论上和本体论上再生产它自己。\n\n这就引出了海德格尔历史哲学的第二个一一甚至是更基本的本体论问题。在存在与时间中缺乏可持续的行为概念和起源的核心是系统地缺乏需求概念。这种缺失更是显而易见\n\n138 In repetition, Dasein’ s birth is caught up, into its existence in coming back from the possibility of death (the possibility which cannot be surpassed)’ Heidegger, SZ, 516 (BT, 443). Simply put, Dasein can catch up' with its birth -but not its death -in anticipatory resoluteness.\n\n139 Were it to be developed, the pure facticity’ of birth would need to be theorised in relation to the factical domain of being-towards-death, which is to say the particular limit specific to each and every act.\n\n140 Consider the temporality of this passage by Lisa Guenther: I suggest that a rigorous distinction must be made between the originating possibility of birth and all the other possibilities granted to me at birth, in order to mark the ontological distinction between the unrepeatable, deeply passive, and irreducibly past possibility of birth, and the heritage of repeatable possibilities given to me at birth. What is at stake in this distinction? On one hand, understood strictly as an ontological limit, birth grants me the sheer possibility of existence; on the other hand, and at the same time, birth grants all the traditions, practices, languages, and other possibilities that together form a heritage that is received but must also be chosen.' Lisa Guenther, ‘Being-from-others: Reading Heidegger after Cavarero’ , Hypatia 23:1 (January-March 2008), 106.\n\n74","previous_page":73,"next_page":75}