{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":75,"pdf_page":79,"physical_index":79,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"a4a6afb5f35549b20383f3da986d191307099b72b7b17c2fca8777e2c9f452da"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"因为有一种未被承认但不可否认的依赖于需要的话语，它贯穿了此在的存在分析。按照海德格尔自己的说法，此在需要世界:它存在的可能性，它的理解能力，如果脱离了“在世界中存在”，是绝对不可能的。世界的优先性是无可争议的。然而，这一基本需求只是在不经意间被主题化了:我们“需要”现成的东西，当它被认为是缺失的，当它已经成为“不现成的”;慎重关怀的时间性赋予了我们“日常需要”的意义。141在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔对“世界超越性的时间问题”的分析中，有一段话表达了需要的本体论中心：“此在的存在是为了它自身的一种能力。”在存在中，它被抛弃了，作为被抛弃的东西，它被交付给它所需要的实体，以便能够像它那样存在一一也就是说，为了自身的缘故。但是些在所需要的实体是什么呢?是什么构成了此在与世界之间的需要关系?简而言之，答案是现成的。现成事物的本体论结构使此在作为一个实体，始终与一个特殊的世界保持着一定的实践关系。现成的东西把在世界的存在规定为一种实践的关系，而正是这种关系把现成的东西和现在的东西区别开来。143正如马克·奥克伦特所说：“现成的东西和现存的东西之间的全部区别在于，作为某种类型的现存的东西，它能够产生与潜在目的无关的效果。”144现成的东西引起人们注意的是这样一个事实，即此在的存在分析不仅通过实践的终结来重新思考行为的目的论结构，而且行为的终结是由实践和poiêsis之间不可分离的联系来定义的。此在的存在是实践，正如弗朗哥·沃尔皮和其他人所证明的145，但它同样是poiêsis(从生产用于使用的必要对象的观点来看，而不是从对象本身来看)。海德格尔的时间哲学隐含地记录了这一点。正如布拉特提醒我们的那样，没有\n\n142 Heidegger, SZ, 482 (BT, 416).\n\n141 Heidegger, BT, 103, 403, 407.\n\n143 As previously discussed, the ready-to-hand is an entity whose being is constituted by any assignment or involvement within-the-world. It is not defined by being a tangible object in space, but rather by its practical relation to the world.\n\n144Mark Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism: Undersțanding, Being and the Critique of Metaphysics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 87. ‘Extant' is Ökrent' s translation of vorhanden, viz. the present-at-hand. Despite its general indifference to the philosophical problem of history, the American pragmatist reading of Heidegger has gone a long way towards enriching the philosophical potential of the ready-to-hand.\n\n145 Franco Volpi, Being and Time: A“Translation\" of the Nicomachean Ethics?’, trans. John Protevi, in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore J. Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 195-212. See, in addition, Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley and London: The University of California Press, 1993), chapters 5 & 6.\n\n75","previous_page":74,"next_page":76}