{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":79,"pdf_page":83,"physical_index":83,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d172e15a56c82c4b07afc60ca45b00849a5a85bac71f1c4af9a51f9feef1d763"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"这种尝试是由海德格尔内部的一种缺口——一种内在的缺陷一一所激发的，这种缺陷，现在应该是显而易见的，是需要概念的决定性缺乏。对于萨特来说，马克思思思性地填补了这一空白，但前提是:(1)马克思的人类需要概念服从于总体化和时间化的逻辑，因为这是它作为“唯物主义”得以维持的唯一途径;这一条件本身的前提条件是(2)辩证法构成了总体化和时间化的逻辑。这是萨特方法论方法的关键:马克思和海德格尔辩证地相互对抗因此，可以说，海德格尔正在被整体化和时间化马克思，马克思正在被辩证化和历史化海德格尔。确保这种独特的方法的是这样一个事实，即海德格尔和马克思一样，都是这种对抗的催化剂。152海德格尔构成了一种缺失，但这是一种结构性的缺失:他和马克思一样，开创了构建一个适当的“唯物主义”人类需要概念的可能性，这个概念，正如我们将看到的，绝不是忠实于马克思所提供的。但是—一这是至关重要的—一这里有一种不平等的交换在起作用。《批判》并不像许多二手文献所描述的那样，是存在主义和马克思主义之间的“综合”。相反，对于萨特来说，海德格尔和马克思之间的关系是一—必须是——不对称的:毕竟，马克思主义是“我们这个时代不可超越的哲学”。153在此存在与现成的东西之间的基本关系一一即在世界中的存在一一在《批判》中被实践与“实践惰性”之间的关系系统地取代，并在本体论上被重构，这种关系以“物质性”的名义出现。辩证的可解性本身就是从这种关系中产生的。对于萨特来说，辩证法是特定物质条件下个人行为的必然结果，因此，为了将马克思融入其中，生活资料的社会生产发生的不同物质“区域”的必要结构。154现在必须证明，这是如何以及为什么相当于总体化和时间化的。\n\n152 Pietro Chiodi suggests that in many important respects the Critique is a straightforward return to the Heideggerian position after the attack on it in Being and Nothingness.’ Pietro Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism [1965], trans. Kate Soper (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1976), 8.\n\n153 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique dę la raison dialectique, tome 1: Théorie des ensembles pratiques [1960] (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 9. Marcuse’ s writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s expresses the same position. His essays during this period seek to rewrite Heidegger’ s phenomenological ontology within the terms of Marx. However, they do not eņgage Heidegger' s philosophy of time, and thus their implicit attempt to fashion a Heideggerian Marxism’ at the level of history and historicality is ultimately a failure, relegating their contribution to what is better described as a 'Marxist Heideggerianism’ . These essays are collected in Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, ed. John Abromeit and Richard Wolin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).\n\n154 This is the manner in which materiality is a historical monism. Critiquing Engels, Sartre contends that the monism which starts from the human world and situates man in Nature is the monism of materiality. This is the only monism which is realișt, and which removes the purely theological temptation to contemplate Nature “without alien addition\".’Sartre, CDR 1, 180-81.\n\n79","previous_page":78,"next_page":80}