{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":82,"pdf_page":86,"physical_index":86,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"a18fdbec33e35ac1b216b581c39fe7e7fe575cbf92eb1cc540d1712e8dd2b585"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"历史的特殊性(作为一个集体的单数，黑格尔和萨特都是这样认为的)165必须加以考虑，但必须先考察物质性本身。\n\n实践和实践惰性之间的关系不能从人类行为和无机物的角度来理解。对于萨特来说，行动和物质从来就不是，也永远不会是，排他性和自给自足的领域：“在实践中……作为物质的否定的行动和作为发展中的重组的真实的、温顺的支持的物质之间存在着辩证的运动和辩证的关系……作为行动的否定。”166.在这个意义上，物质已经永远是工作的物质;物质本身，也就是说，从它的纯粹外在性的观点来考虑的活动物质，在人类经验中没有任何地方出现过。167萨特关于劳动物质的概念是一个潜在的基础，从这个基础上，《德意志意识形态》中的“劳动”可以(追溯地)作为《提纲》中实践的意义而得到保障，这样，劳动物质就是“历史的基本动力”，在这个动力中，“所有的行动都团结起来，并具有一种意义(感官)，也就是说，它们构成了一个共同未来的所有统一性。168.工作物质无疑是实践惰性的核心，但它绝不是实践惰性的全部范围。实践惰性援引(并超越了)马克思的生产力概念，吸收了一种从根本上扩展的、不同的力量集合：“在某种程度上……这些力量是惯性的力量……它们以被动统一的形式引入外部，作为内在的物质纽带。”169对弗林来说，实践惰性是《存在与虚无》中“自在存在”的功能性(可以加上异端的)继承者。170它所指定的被动性的多种形式积极地构成了实践领域，但仅就这些由反实践(“没有作者的实践”)和“无作者的实践”定义的反辩证力量而言\n\n167 Sartre, CDR 1, 180.\n\n165 there is one human history, with one truth and one iņtelligibility.’ Ibid. 69. The critical departure which Sartre' s conception of negation makes from Hegel' s is inseparable from his dialecticisation of Heidegger' s anti-dialectical philosophy of difference. Šartre is a notable exception to the predominant trajectory of the philosophy of difference within 20th century French philosophy more generally.\n\n166 Ibid. 159. Matter as the receptacle of passivised practices is indissolubly linked to lived praxis, which simultaneously adapts to material conditions and inert significations, and renews their meaning [sens], reconstituting them by transcending them, if only to transform them.’ Ibid. 168. Flynn emphasises the crucial distinction between signification [signification] and meaning/direction [sens] in Sartre’ s work: the former refers to a static, conceptual meaning’ , whereas the latter 'denotes the ongoing unity of a lived process.' Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 104. Just as history cannot be a totality but it can, it is. a totalisation, so too it cannot be signified but it can, it does, have sens.\n\n168 Ibid. 183. On multiple occasions (90, 124, 136-37, 165, 178, etc.) in which worked matter is the implicit or explicit subject, Sartre either implies or explicitly states that labour is the historical meaning of praxis.\n\n169 Ibid. 179. Thus materialised praxishas the effect of uniting men precisely to the extent that it separates them by imposing on everyone a meaningful reality infinitely richer and more contradictory than they anticipated individually.' Ibid. Totalisation and the practico-inert are indissociable.\n\n170 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 120.\n\n82","previous_page":81,"next_page":83}