{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":83,"pdf_page":87,"physical_index":87,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"f105c2389d677a8553fa99269d6132bac0cde8de94476e4a8b22d874ba6d98f7"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"“反终性”否定了辩证实践计划的终性。“然而，这种否定不是通过破坏或消解，而是通过偏离和反转来运作的”171，这种否定的效果是“将材料置于项目之外，并将其作为自由的必然性而与之相对立”。172因此，像实践一样，实践惰性在内部是由行动和物质之间的多重、变化的关系构成的，这些关系在“被动活动”的力量中结合在一起。173然而，与实践不同的是，实践惰性既不是总体化的起源，也不是总体化的本体论基础：“实践惰性可以被视为一个过程…,但是这个过程，就它已经是被动的行动而言，以整个实践为前提…，它在对象中重新吸收和转化了整个实践，同时仍然以它的现实的、抽象的人口为基础。”174.正如马克思关于活劳动和死劳动的辩证法一样，实践的物质实现完全依赖于实践惰性的领域，正如实践惰性只有通过实践才能被激活一样。然而，实践，而且只有“实践”……在其辩证的自由中，是(在迄今为正的人类历史中)人们通过劳动物质强加于人的一切非人的判决的现实的和永久的基础。175.因此，《批判》的人文主义同时受到物质的缓和和推动:实践在本体论上对物质的外在性负责，但外在性本身只不过是实践的产物，是作为外在化的总体化的产物。\n\n只有当这种关系的两个基本的、不可分离的方面被揭示出来时，实践和惰性实践之间的关系才能被证实为一种物质关系一一事实上是“物质性”本身的意义。第一，个别实践之间的关系本身是辩证的，这种关系是由实践惰性作为中介的。换句话说，实践惰性决定了作为内在社会性的人类活动:在每个个体实践的辩证结构和这种关系之间存在着一种辩证关系，据此，个体行动“被惰性超越和保存”，是一种“物化社会性的原始规约”。176.在这种方式下，“实践惰性”仅仅是他人的活动，因为它是由无机惰性维持和转移的。177萨特的辩证法在本体论上仍然是个人主义的，但个人的优先地位被他的个人主义所削弱\n\n171 Sartre, CDR 1, 340.\n\n172 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 49.\n\n173 Within the field of the practico-inert, matter as passive activity and couņterfinality contradicts its own idea through its movement.' Sartre, CDR, 171. Curiously, Flynn restricts passive activity' to serialised individual action rather than situating it across the entire (human and non-human) milieu of the practico-inert. See Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective Responsibility (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 96, 105.\n\n174 Sartre, CDR 1, 713. For Sartre, a practico-inert process is a systematic form of exploitation (such as racişm, capitalism or colonialism) which must be differentiated from the three modalities of human action' : individual praxis, common, constituted praxis, and praxis-process. Ibid. 789.\n\n175 Ibid. 333.\n\n176 Ibid. 319.\n\n177 Ibid. 556.\n\n83","previous_page":82,"next_page":84}