{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":91,"pdf_page":95,"physical_index":95,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1a44a4ed4367d0d7bcea474b05e1691d07f05ab6f30845f892c8477e034380a4"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"它们本身，只有在实践和实践惰性之间的辩证法202中，或者可以被描述为总体化的现在和总体化的过去之间的辩证法中，才是现实的。实践和实践惰性都“包含了自身的超越性运动”，但每一个都包含了与不同的超越性相对应的不同类型的运动。实践是一种介于现在和过去之间的辩证运动，在这种运动中，现在被优先考虑为过去对未来的总体超越。作为总体化的现在,实践是作为整体的过去的辩证否定，也就是说，现在的物质性是作为物质的过去的辩证否定。在某种程度上，它被具身为物质。就它被总体化为一个总体而言，过去注定是惰性的(总体不能消除它同自己的生产过程的分离)。但是，过去同样注定要运动，因为总化的现在如果不把物质重新内在化，就不能总化(没有poiêsis就没有实践)。与实践相反，实践惰性把被总体化的过去作为一种反辩证的力量优先考虑，这种力量不断地削弱现在超越过去的能力，这样一来，未来就变得不可超越，因为它已经意味着并已经将自己与过去等同起来。作为再现和历史重复的环境，实践惰性构成了这样一个立场，从这个立场出发，被动性是“作为未来存在的整体”，而工作物质是“未来的固化威胁”。203这种在反实践和反最终性手中的“目的盗窃”204将时间化变形为被动时间性的生产(泰勒主义中的“组织者的聪明才智”在于用被动时间性取代时间化)。205)简而言之，实践惰性的时间化，但仅仅是因为，引用马克思的话，它代表了作为时间化的人类实践的变态[verr<s:1> cktheit]。\n\n很明显，实践惰性和实践惰性的辩证法有可能放大前一章对第一个历史行为的时间解读。一般来说，《批判》为这一行为的过去和未来增加了重要的深度，限定了但没有取消这一行为赋予现在的优先权。正如前一章所暗示的那样，在创造满足现有需要的手段和创造新需要的辩证法中，过去可以被认同为现有需要的领域。然而，从萨特的观点来看，\n\n202 It is crucial to remind ourselves that the dialectic between praxis and the practico-inert is not simply another name for the dialectic between action and matter, but is rather a complex dialectic between a dialectical and anti-dialectical configuration between action and matter.\n\n203 Ibid. 86, 184.\n\n204 Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, 53.\n\n205 Sartre, CDR 1, 559. This dovetails with how a groupincorporates lived temporality with the passive temporality of the practico-inert, so as to accomplish, through actions that are multiple and the same, a common result.’ See Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 200.\n\n91","previous_page":90,"next_page":92}