{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":92,"pdf_page":96,"physical_index":96,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"2a7d895b2fc2ea4559f7ba57d0416b0ed1d5bc77f83addd499f5028bbfbd92f1"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"这个过去承担了一种构成功能，它超越了现在对它的单纯创造和否定。过去不再是非辩证的，而是反辩证的:它在内部反对现在内部的否定，作为否定本身的特殊否定(紧急性是“过去-现在-过去”的运动，它是“现在-过去-现在”的需要运动的内部)。因此，生活资料的社会生产(对萨特来说)已经被实践惰性所控制(异化和阶级已经在第一个历史行为中)。至于第一次历史行动的未来，萨特和海德格尔显然为我们提供了一个框架，通过这个框架，我们可以把未来作为当下内在的东西来把握:行动的目的论结构。第一章宣称，未来并不在于等待:它不是在等待中重复一种在现在和过去之间上演的实际辩证法。然而，它并没有把终极确定为这种情况的原因，这样，只有行为的结束才统一了行为的时间。终极目标——而不是否定——提供了一个立足点，从这个立足点出发，总体性和时间性之间的实际依赖得到了保障。因此，问题出现了:海德格尔和萨特赋予未来的统一力量，以及萨特赋予过去的预制力量，是否在第一次历史行动中削弱了现在的本体论优先权?答案，用一句话来说，是否定的。未来和过去是这一行为的构成特征，但只是因为它们是当下所固有的。萨特并没有强调这一点，而且很可能会拒绝这一点。《批判》的指导思想是，未来和过去完全决定并因此过度决定了现在，206但这一思想并没有与这样的时间化只在现在内实际存在的观点相比较。在海德格尔之后，这并不是对现在和在场(物质的现象学表象)之间的同一性的呼吁。更基本的是，这是萨特没有考虑到的概念，即现在是运动本身的本体论意义，在其主动和惰性的范围内。在这个意义上，总体化的实践和被动的活动是当下不可分割的运动。207远远不符合共时性/历时性的框架，这个现在与本章引言中概述的现象学现在相关:适当物化，它是思考过去和未来相互关系的条件。如果这个“现在”是主体之间“不可逾越的”“有害的鸿沟”\n\n206 See in particular Sartre, CDR 1, 709. The present is -by far -the least theorised of the three temporal modes in the Critique, largely because the historicist framework of synchrony/diachrony predetermines its meaning. This leads Flynn to problematically accept that temporalisation = diachronic totalisation (which in turn is = historical totalisation). See Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 111.\n\n207 After Hegel, Heidegger and Marcuse, it is important to establish the difference and relation between the movement/motility [Bewegtheit] of existence/life and the motion [Bewegung] of a tangible object in space (see footnote 127 in this chapter and footnote 69 in Chapter 1). This difference does not feature in Marx but, this thesis argues, it might be productively integrated into his work (especially the various drafts of Capital).\n\n92","previous_page":91,"next_page":93}