{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","uuid":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","normalized_title":"知觉现象学梅洛庞蒂文集第2卷phénoménologiedelaperception","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","isbns":["9787100200967"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":682,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%9F%A5%E8%A7%89%E7%8E%B0%E8%B1%A1%E5%AD%A6%EF%BC%88%E6%A2%85%E6%B4%9B-%E5%BA%9E%E8%92%82%E6%96%87%E9%9B%86%20%E7%AC%AC2%E5%8D%B7%EF%BC%89%EF%BC%88ph%C3%A9nom%C3%A9nologie%20de%20la%20perception%20%EF%BC%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/search"},"page":{"printed_page":209,"pdf_page":220,"physical_index":220,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"928a620f5897761be5b4593815d046add0031a9993c3c6bd8138234fd3b9123a"},"chapter":"第二章 身体经验和古典心理学","content":"总之，我们通过研究运动机能发现了“意义”这个词的一种新意义。理智主义心理学和观念主义哲学的力量来自于这一点：它们毫无困难地表明，知觉和思维有一种内在的意义，而且不能被偶然地集合在一起的内容的外在联想所说明。我思是意识到这一内在性。然而，任何含义由此也都被看作是一种思维行为，是一个纯粹的我的活动，而且，即便理智主义很容易战胜经验主义，它也不能说明我们的经验的多样性，不能说明经验中没有意义的东西，不能说明各种内容的偶然性。身体经验使我们认识到对意义强制规定(它不是一个普遍构造意识的强制规定)，认识到一种依附于某些内容的意义。我的身体是这一含义核心，它像一般功能那样运行，然而它实存着，并且容易受到疾病的影响。在它那里，我们学会去认识我们一般地在知觉中重新发现的、因此不得不更完备地加以描述的本质和实存之间的这一纽结。\n\n172\n\n第三章 本己身体的空间性和运动机能\n\n209\n\n① 瓦莱里：莱奥纳多·达·芬奇方法引论(杂集)，第177页。","previous_page":208,"next_page":210}