{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","uuid":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","normalized_title":"知觉现象学梅洛庞蒂文集第2卷phénoménologiedelaperception","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","isbns":["9787100200967"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":682,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%9F%A5%E8%A7%89%E7%8E%B0%E8%B1%A1%E5%AD%A6%EF%BC%88%E6%A2%85%E6%B4%9B-%E5%BA%9E%E8%92%82%E6%96%87%E9%9B%86%20%E7%AC%AC2%E5%8D%B7%EF%BC%89%EF%BC%88ph%C3%A9nom%C3%A9nologie%20de%20la%20perception%20%EF%BC%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/search"},"page":{"printed_page":39,"pdf_page":50,"physical_index":50,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"7b615c044650e43d7fc9d00023625a1f5a2e277e1e9e2aae917993f384a1cbb3"},"chapter":"第二章“联想”与“记忆投射”","content":"然而，那些应当开始和结束全部认识的感觉和形象从来都只在一种意义视域中呈现，并且被知觉者的含义远不是产生自一种联想，相反，不管涉及对当前图形的综观还是对先前经验的追忆，23它在所有联想中都已经被预设了。我们的知觉场是由一些“事物”和“各个事物之间的那些空无”构成的。一个事物的各部分并不是通过一种单纯的外在联想连接起来的一这一联想产生自它们在物体发生各种运动期间获得确认的相互关联。最初，我把目己从来都没有看到在运动的一些整体看作是事物：房子、太阳、群山。如果有人希望我把从一些移动物体的经验中获得的一个概念延伸到不动的物体中，当然需要山脉在其实际的外观中表现出某种特征(它为山脉作为事物获得承认提供了依据，并且为这一迁移说明了理由）。这一特征真的无需任何迁移就足以说明场域的分离。其至儿童可以操作和移动的日常物品的统一都不能归结为对它们的相互关联的确认。如果我们让自己把事物之间的那些间隔看作是事物，那么世界的外观就像在我发现“兔子”或“猎人”时谜面的\n\n第二章“联想”与“记忆投射”\n\n39\n\n①胡塞尔：逻辑研究，“纯粹逻辑学导引”，第68页。\n\n②参比如苛勒：格式塔心理学，第164-165页。","previous_page":38,"next_page":40}