{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","id":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","uuid":"c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title":"知觉现象学（梅洛-庞蒂文集 第2卷）（phénoménologie de la perception ）","normalized_title":"知觉现象学梅洛庞蒂文集第2卷phénoménologiedelaperception","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787100200967","isbns":["9787100200967"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":682,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%9F%A5%E8%A7%89%E7%8E%B0%E8%B1%A1%E5%AD%A6%EF%BC%88%E6%A2%85%E6%B4%9B-%E5%BA%9E%E8%92%82%E6%96%87%E9%9B%86%20%E7%AC%AC2%E5%8D%B7%EF%BC%89%EF%BC%88ph%C3%A9nom%C3%A9nologie%20de%20la%20perception%20%EF%BC%89","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c1764724-e0ff-46ca-b471-5da021362f4e/search"},"page":{"printed_page":"I","pdf_page":12,"physical_index":12,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"bc639b91b8236fa308fbd40ef99d95b9a826ec1d187b42523e483248530ce4ed"},"chapter":"第二章时间性……………………","content":"前 言\n\n什么是现象学？在胡塞尔最初那些著作出版半个世纪之后，我们还要提出这个问题，或许显得有些奇怪。然而，这个问题远没有得到解决。现象学是关于本质的研究，据此所有问题都归结为对本质，例如对知觉的本质、意识的本质，加以界定。但现象学也是这样一种哲学：它把本质重新放回到实存之中，认为我们只能从人和世界的“人为性”出发理解人和世界。它是一种先验哲学，它为了理解人和世界而悬置自然态度的断言。但它还是这样一种哲学：对于它来说，世界总是在反思之前就作为一种不可让渡的在场“已经在此”，而全部的努力就在于恢复与世界的这种素朴的联系，以便最终给予这一联系一种哲学地位。它是作为一门“严格的科学”的哲学之雄心，但它也是对“被亲历的”空间、时间和世界的记录。这是按照我们的经验之所是对我们的经验进行一种直接描述的尝试，而没有考虑其心理的发生，没有考虑科学家、历史学家或社会学家能够为其提供的因果说明；然而，胡塞尔在其最后的著作中提到了一种“发生的现象学”，①甚至一种“建构的现象学”。②有\n\nI\n\n①笛卡尔式的沉思，第120页及以下。\n\n②参贝尔热很乐意与我们交流的由欧根·芬克编辑的未刊的第六笛卡尔式的沉思。","previous_page":11,"next_page":13}