{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title":"技术与时间：2.迷失方向：人文与社会译丛","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544711999","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","uuid":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title":"技术与时间：2.迷失方向：人文与社会译丛","normalized_title":"技术与时间2迷失方向人文与社会译丛","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544711999","isbns":["9787544711999"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":306,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E4%B8%8E%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4%EF%BC%9A2.%E8%BF%B7%E5%A4%B1%E6%96%B9%E5%90%91%EF%BC%9A%E4%BA%BA%E6%96%87%E4%B8%8E%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%AF%91%E4%B8%9B","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/search"},"page":{"printed_page":230,"pdf_page":239,"physical_index":239,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"f6894fb41603b4918a0b0edd8bce8c01489a9562ac2080a8410b17bc2a25c6f7"},"chapter":"第四章时间物体和滞留有限性","content":"布伦塔诺的理论得出的结论是：不存在对接替和变更的感知。我们相信自已听到一支乐曲，这意味着我们还听到了刚刚过去的声音，但(按照布伦塔诺的观点)这只是一种从原初联想的生动性而来的假象(Schein)。①\n\n相反，胡塞尔认为“囊括现在与过去的意识统一性是现象学素材”，而且感知与想象之间理应有差别，否则便是无稽之谈。然而，这就会把感知像在场那样加以隔离和纯化，虽然感知是对扩展的当即的感知，即对所有(总是以某种形式想象出来的)第二记忆的感知;这也就更有理由把依赖已经在此的所有可能性都排除出去。但我们看到，胡塞尔因此也不得不排斥对时间流的动态理解。欲把想象与感知、第二记忆与初级记忆区别开来，同时又不把在场与不在场相对立，就必须放弃感知的优先地位。这势必给对实在与虚构的绝对区分，即对实证性与创造性的绝对区分造成危机在滞留有限性被工业合理化之时，在所有事物及所有事件的时间物体演变使创造性四处普及之时，骤然产生的正是这种危机。换言之，如果说\n\n布伦塔诺[…]对这个不可回避也不可能视而不见的对时间的感知与想象间的区别置之不理是令人吃惊的，\n\n那么在工业中把这种区别横加抹杀不是更令人诧异吗？\n\n为了克服时间物体固有的困难(通过想象而达到的原初联想不是一个真正的解决方法)，胡塞尔赋予意向性双重含义,“一种指意识与以意识形式显现之物’的关系，另一种指意识与以普通形式显现之物——即先验的被感知之物——的关系”①。但我们将看到，胡塞尔事实上如何且为何只能考虑到这个二元性中的一个侧面，这是一种过分的简化。\n\n技术与时间四\n\n① 《内在时间意识的现象学讲座》,第21页。\n\n230","previous_page":229,"next_page":231}