{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title":"技术与时间：2.迷失方向：人文与社会译丛","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544711999","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","id":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","uuid":"c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title":"技术与时间：2.迷失方向：人文与社会译丛","normalized_title":"技术与时间2迷失方向人文与社会译丛","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544711999","isbns":["9787544711999"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":306,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E4%B8%8E%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4%EF%BC%9A2.%E8%BF%B7%E5%A4%B1%E6%96%B9%E5%90%91%EF%BC%9A%E4%BA%BA%E6%96%87%E4%B8%8E%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%AF%91%E4%B8%9B","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c377f608-9f8d-4e82-acf0-78a48f7daa88/search"},"page":{"printed_page":249,"pdf_page":258,"physical_index":258,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ab07fb5a3533a6399d704b748bff6f16c5eb5bdc122632e953993995fb7280d3"},"chapter":"第四章时间物体和滞留有限性","content":"然而，这个时间场的限制性并非滞留有限性。那么它的性质是什么呢？换言之，扩展的真实属性是什么？须扩展的内容实际上是什么？\n\n在展开先验历史的问题时，胡塞尔把原初几何直观的可能性植根于累积式科学的可能性中，作为发明当下的再激活之可能性。他不会再把第三记忆置于构建之外，因为大当即将会变成特大的当即或者说超级当即，建构也将变成(重新)建构。《几何学起源》一书把第三记忆(即由文字的确正代具化给予的世界历史的图像意识）变成第二记忆进入初级记忆的条件和作为复苏或继续存在的再激活之条件。由于活的滞留的限制，没有文字(没有活的在场的改变)就既不会有发明也不会有几何传统。但在此不区分体验与非体验、初级记忆与第二记忆、第二记忆与第三记忆就意味着对现象学本身的原则提出质疑。遗产始于感知，且仅仅始于感知，亦终于感知：正是作为最高原则提出的感知的直观性不允许把第二性纳入到遗产中。\n\n8. 图灵机器关联物的回声\n\n然而，正如开端的主题限制了分析的内涵，我们必须在胡塞尔后面的章节中推迟消失的主题。\n\n如果在乐曲演奏中出现了停顿，那就没有任何新的感知阶段而只有新近记忆的单纯阶段与上一感知阶段相连接，然后某种类似的记忆又与这个新近记忆相连，依此类推。在过去中的推迟便这样不断产生了，这一属性不断被改变直至消失。事实上衰退与改变相辅相成，最终导致非感知性。①\n\n第四章时间物体和滞留有限性\n\n①《内在时间意识的现象学讲座》,第45页。\n\n249","previous_page":248,"next_page":250}