{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":153,"pdf_page":165,"physical_index":165,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8b4bb3f380a19640648bb578f9bb0d48cff6c9d04d995c8902811a0eae9243b4"},"chapter":"第二章","content":"从这些评论可以明显地看到：甚至在论证正义的首要原则时，一般事实和道德前提也都是需要的（当然，以下情况也一直是清楚的：次一级的道德规范和特殊的伦理判断依赖于事实前提和标准原则）。在契约论中，这些道德前提采取了描述最初的契约状态的形式。显然，一般事实和道德前提在达到一种正义观时也是各有分工的，这种分工按各种理论的不同而互异。如我所述，原则在体现可欲的道德理想方面各各不同。功利主义的一个特征就是太依赖于从一般事实获得的论据。功利主义者倾向于这样答复反对他们的意见，即坚持认为社会和人性的规律排除了与他们的判断相反的论据。相反，作为公平的正义象通常被理解的那样较直接地在其首要原则中孕育着正义的理想。这一观念在达到对我们的正义判断的一种吻合时较少依靠一般事实。这使它适应于更为宽广的可能事实领域。\n\n153","previous_page":152,"next_page":154}