{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":160,"pdf_page":172,"physical_index":172,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"65409af1e678b03e696938a35733ce0b64563da002f566cfd892adb460627d24"},"chapter":"第二章","content":"然而，按照契约论的观点，这个奴隶主的论据的一般形式是正确的。如果奴隶反驳说他的论点是无关的，因为实际上一直并没有这样的选择机会，并且人们无法平等分担未来事件的风险，那么他们的驳斥是一个错误。契约论纯粹是假设的：如果一种正义观将在原初状态中被同意，那么它的原则就是可应用的正当原则。说这样一种协议从未有过也永远不会实现，并不构成一种反对意见。我们不能如此论述：在找不到解释个人的义务与职责的一致意见的情况下，我们就在假设的意义上解释正义理论，然后马上又坚持冒险状态必须是真实的以抛弃我们不想要的正义原则。①这样，在作为公平的正义论中，反驳奴隶主的论据的方式就是展示他诉诸的原则将在原初状态中被拒绝。我们没有别的选择，只能利用最初状态（按照有利的解释）的不同方面来建立支持两个正义原则的完善论据。在下一节中我就要开始这一工作。\n\n160","previous_page":159,"next_page":161}