{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":181,"pdf_page":193,"physical_index":193,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"65141e2ac81cc3f50f433e836bf5d597ca99e0050e33939bc605b06dec82f08f"},"chapter":"第二章","content":"然而，完全的利他主义有一个特征是值得描述的。只要别的什么人具有独立的或第一层次的欲望，一个完全的利他主义者就能满足自己的欲望。为说明这一事实，假设在决定做一件事时，所有人都投票做别人想做的事情，这样显然就什么都确定不了，事实上也没有什么要决定的。正义问题要产生，必定至少有两个人想做某件事，而不是想做所有其他的人都做的事情。这样，假定各方是完全的利他主义者就是不可能的。他们必是有某些可能冲突的各自分离的利益。作为公平的正义以相互冷淡的形式——这一原初状态的主要动机条件——做出了这种假设。这虽然可能被证明是一极其简化的形式，但人们能据此确立一个合理普遍的正义观。\n\n①见《知识和评价的分析》，第547页。\n\n181","previous_page":180,"next_page":182}