{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":324,"pdf_page":336,"physical_index":336,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"2ceb590b94b684774ae2cc794fbcb69d26750f61448e1d710119c2cb38d5387e"},"chapter":"第六章","content":"于是，我们可以做的最简单的事情就是把两个正义原则用作对个人的正当观的一部分。我们可以把正义的自然义务规定为支持和发展那些能满足正义原则的制度的义务，以这种方式，我们达到了一个与用于制度的标准相一致的原则。不过，还存在着这样一个问题：如果处在原初状态中的各方要求按照他们的自愿行为，例如按照他们从这些制度中受益的行为，或按照他们已允诺或已从事的行为来遵守正义制度的话，他们是否会做得更好。带有这种条件的原则乍看上去似乎更符合那种强调自由同意和保护自由的契约观点。但是，使用这个先决条件实际上将会一无所获。从两个正义原则的词典式次序的观点来看，各种平等自由的完整性已经得到保障。因此，在这一方面毋需作出进一步的保证。而且，各方有一切理由来保障正义制度的稳定，而这样做最容易和最直接的办法就是不管个人的自愿行为而接受那些支持和服从正义制度的要求。\n\n324","previous_page":323,"next_page":325}