{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":37,"pdf_page":49,"physical_index":49,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"f2d33b7f9c8ab1db612f5329ee1b5f19a653f64880ab0ae7b791978766f71cce"},"chapter":"正 义 论","content":"8. 优先问题\n\n我们看到，直觉主义提出了范围的问题：即在什么范围内我们有可能对我们所考虑的有关正义的判断给出一种系统的解释。直觉主义特别认为，对于各种冲突的正义原则的衡量，不可能给出任何建设性的解答，我们至少在此必须依靠我们的直觉能力。当然，古典的功利主义试图完全避免诉诸直觉，它是一种单独原则的观点，只有一个根本标准。对衡量的调整至少在理论上是参照功利原则来决定的。密尔认为，必须只容许一个这样的标准，否则，在冲突的标准之间就没有仲裁者了。西季维克详细地论证说，功利原则是唯一能够充当这一角色的原则。他们坚持主张，我们的道德判断在下述意义上无疑是功利主义的，即当面临道德命令的冲突，或者概念模糊不清时，我们没有别的选择，而只能采取功利主义。密尔与西季维克在有些地方相信：我们必须有一个单独的原则来改正和统一我们的判断。①毋庸置疑，这种古典理论的一个最大魅力就在于它正视优先问题并试图避免依靠直觉。\n\n①见《伦理学原理》第6章。穆尔的理论的直觉主义性质足被他的有机统一的原则确定的，第27一31页（参见商务印书馆1983年版中文本）.\n\n②见W.0.罗斯：《正当与善》，第21—27页。\n\n37","previous_page":36,"next_page":38}