{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","id":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","uuid":"c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title":"正义论","normalized_title":"正义论","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7500402449","isbns":["7500402449"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":624,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%AD%A3%E4%B9%89%E8%AE%BA","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/c3e269f2-c36d-4862-98ef-fa37a2f8b009/search"},"page":{"printed_page":597,"pdf_page":609,"physical_index":609,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"9cb73a918954b72736540615835cc8fe7b62cb9a405819a232b315b4b59e51e4"},"chapter":"第九章","content":"正当的完整观念(Right，complete conception of) 103, 329, 338;\n\n其规定 28\n\n在作为公平的正义中的地位28.39①, 436, 550,\n\n与善的不确定性435；\n\n口我的统-519；\n\n其影响选抒的不确性的方式519；\n\n正当概念的形式限制(Formalcons-traintts of concept of right)124-120;\n\n袁义分析不提供正当概念的形式限制124;\n\n从道德原则的功能中派生的性质125;\n\n一般性 1251\n\n普遍性 126\n\n公开性 1281\n\n次序 127,\n\n终结性 129;\n\n排除利已主义的诸变体 129，\n\n正当观念的内容(Content of concep-tiona of.right)\n\n无意义之点的排除 143\n\n与心理上的可理解性 462，473\n\n正当性证明（Iustificatiou） 14—18,564—573;\n\n作为合理选择的--个问题 15，567\n\n在页了虑的判断与原则中的作用15, 114, 567—570;\n\n作为诈多思考的相互支持18，566\n\n对笛卡尔式的正当性证明及自然主义的正当性证明的反对意见5643\n\n作为正当性证明的正义论说明的三个部分566\n\n对所考虑的正当性证明方法的反对意见 567-5701\n\n对所讨论的作为公平的正义的一些反对意见 570—573\n\n与最初状态中的伦理变化572\n\n正义的不确定性（Indeterminacy ofjustice) 191, 351, 538,\n\n正义的储存原则(Just savings prin-ciple) 276—283,\n\n用于正义的储存原则的动机假设122, 134, 279, 281;\n\n需要这种原则来确定社会最低受惠值274;\n\n时间编爱 276，283，287\n\n古典功利主义中的正义的储存原则276, 287,\n\n契约论的正义的储存原则的构思 277—280,\n\n与互惠280：\n\n与差别原则的关系 281\n\n公共储存政策与民主原则 285\n\n与优先问题 287，\n\n在两个正义原则的最后陈述中的地位291\n\n与政治解决的原则350\n\n时间偏爱\n\n正义的穷二原则(Second priaciple of justice) 60-70;\n\n第一陈述 563\n\n第二陈述 79;\n\n最后陈述 292\n\n共解释 61—71\n\n与自然的自由体系 60，67，70\n\n与效率原则61—66\n\n与自由的平等 681\n\n与自然的贵族制 701\n\n与民主的平等和差别原则 71—78  \n与立法阶段 188\n\n正义的第一原则(First principlo of\n\n597","previous_page":596,"next_page":598}