{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","title":"非人：漫谈时间","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787562155560","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","id":"ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","uuid":"ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","title":"非人：漫谈时间","normalized_title":"非人漫谈时间","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787562155560","isbns":["9787562155560","9782252039427"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":325,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%9D%9E%E4%BA%BA%EF%BC%9A%E6%BC%AB%E8%B0%88%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ca7a386a-a284-41ec-b146-be626cc2ac01/search"},"page":{"printed_page":25,"pdf_page":45,"physical_index":45,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1204a9331e3d6b7e72301200cd2e393afb361ec4ddfc483ec3b189a76698f50e"},"chapter":"非人：漫谈时间","content":"由这个反对意见，我们看到：使得思想和身体不可分离的东西，不再纯粹只是身体是思想必需的硬件，是它存在的物质条件，而是双方在与各自环境（感性的、象征的）的关系里是互相类似的，这种关系本身在两种情况里都属于类似。我们发现，在这个描述里，有一个强有力的理由不支持最近由普特南发展出来的假设，即智能在原则上的“可分离性”，通过这种可分离性，普特南想要把人工智能的运作合法化。\n\n26\n\n如果思想可以摆脱身体\n\n25\n\n1 希拉里·怀特哈尔·普特南(Hilary Whitehall Putnam，1926—2016)，美国分析哲学家、数学家和计算机学家。作品有《逻辑哲学》(PhilosophyofLogic)、《数学、物质和方法》(Mathematics, Matter and Method)等。—译者注","previous_page":24,"next_page":26}