{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":143,"pdf_page":147,"physical_index":147,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1a0698992ea5a7f3e6606f6083d3bf614bf465811934a00a5f839856b11fb12a"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"4.1.1 Subsumption\n\nThe concept which Marx uses to capture the relation between the labour- and valorisationprocess, a concept without which, this thesis argues, history cannot be thought, is subsumption [Subsumtion]. In short, subsumption is the concept which structures Marx’s understanding of the production-process of capital. For this reason, we must briefly consider its philosophical development leading up to Marx. The modern usage of ‘subsumption’ is associated with Kant, who was the first to establish the sense in which subsumption refers to the processes through which the universal and the particular enter in relation with one another, or more precisely the sense in which the particular is brought under the universal, and thereby transformed in some manner. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, subsumption is the essential process underlying the faculty of judgement [Urteilskraft]. For Kant, it captures the relation between the manifold and the categories of the understanding, between the sensible and the logical: ‘to the use of a concept there…belongs a function of the power of judgement, whereby an object is subsumed under it.’<sup>29</sup> To return to Chapter 1, subsumption is a central feature of Kant’s analysis of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding.<sup>30</sup> The Critique of Pure Reason directly assigns a temporalising logic to subsumption: the question of ‘the application of the category to appearances’<sup>31</sup> must be addressed through the numerous schematics of time. Subsumption introduces the ‘third thing’ – the multiple time-determinations, culminating in the entire scope or ‘field of time’ [Zeitinbegriff] – that secures the possibility of a relation between categories and appearances. (The interesting thing at play here is not that the schematism of the categories provides a multidimensional framework for temporalising the relation between abstract and concrete labour, but the sense in which Marx reproduces Kant in his position that time is the ‘third thing’ that allows two commodities, and thus we might say abstract and concrete labour, to have a relation in the first place). Subsumption does not figure as extensively in Hegel as it does in Kant, but the former is consistent in his critique of the latter’s use of this concept. For Hegel, the essential problem with Kantian subsumption is that it does not register the fact that the universal is universal by virtue of the fact that it has a determinate content. In other words, Kantian subsumption is, for Hegel, a ‘one-sided’ or ‘bad’ abstraction: it strips away what is particular about the particular, and thereby prevents the universal from manifesting itself as a singularity or concrete universal. Kantian subsumption does not tell us what is essential about the object, since it lacks the concrete fullness without which abstractive power is productive. For Hegel, the manifold is not external to the concept, but is rather the concept incarnate. Thus if one takes the standpoint of the ‘self-subsistence of both subject and predicate’ (which Kant does, because his transcendental subject – the Gemüt – is a human subject), then ‘subsumption is only the application of the universal to a particular or an individual, which is placed under the universal in accordance with a vague idea that it is of inferior quality.’<sup>32</sup> Hegel’s problem is not subsumption as such – the very rationality, the dialectical movement, of the syllogism depends on relations of subsumption – but the failure to recognise that subsumption is nothing if it is not also thought in relation to inherence [Inhärenz]. That is, subsumption registers the fact that the universal and particular inhere in one another, albeit in different ways.<sup>33</sup>\n\n<sup>29</sup> Kant, CPR, A248/B304, 359.\n\n<sup>30</sup> The opening line of the schematism of the categories reads: ‘In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be homogeneous with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just is what is meant by the expression “an object is contained under a concept”.’ Ibid. A137/B176, 271.\n\n<sup>31</sup> Ibid. A138/B177, 272.\n\n143","previous_page":142,"next_page":144}