{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":19,"pdf_page":23,"physical_index":23,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"91f2af5e66de45e8131a47aa3f2ba88944d67fbd7b32b3ab83f4725aee85d7d5"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"This summary is provided in order to underscore the fact that Kant’s philosophy of time is not a means with which to undertake a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history. Epistemologically, insofar as it extends the subject-object relation in Kant, Marx’s grasping of the object of appearance as sensuous human activity, which is grasped, further, by sensuous human activity, and therefore by the open unity of the ensemble of social relations, effectively precludes the use of Kant’s schematism, because, ontologically, a subject which is practice is the place of this transcendental time-determination. As the subject in Marx, sensuous human activity is the performance of the temporal function of the imagination in Kant, and it thereby precludes the separation of this function from the manifold of intuition. Simply put, it makes no sense to suggest that Marx’s concept of practice (and thus history) is temporally intelligible through Kant’s schemata. We must add, moreover, that this is true on Kant’s own terms. From the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘practice’ is not only not present in the table of categories (it is not one of the ‘ancestral concepts’ [Stammbegriffe] of the pure understanding), but it is also not a ‘predicable’ concept (derivative concepts that owe their intelligibility to the categories).<sup>25</sup> In sum, for Kant, practice is not an epistemological concept. Its conceptual status is rather presented in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Critique – the Critique of Practical Reason – wherein it comprises the practical ‘deployment’ of reason. Hence Marx’s rejection in the Theses of any systematic distinction between a transcendental aesthetic and transcendental analytic, between sensibility and conceptuality, is in a sense confirmed by the impossibility, for Kant, of affording practice the power of temporalisation by way of the schematism of the categories. If practice is in some manner the persistence of the real in time and the condition of possibility of thinking temporal succession, the schema of substance<sup>26</sup> cannot secure this for us. More fundamentally, if, as it is possible to argue, practice is constitutive of the entire scope or ‘field of time’ [Zeitinbegriff] itself, the schema of modality<sup>27</sup> cannot secure the significance [Bedeutung] of this.\n\n<sup>24</sup> Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [1929], trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 102. Given his overall project, it is not surprising that in his reading of schematism Heidegger proclaims that ‘…these eleven pages of the Critique of Pure Reason form the heart of the whole work’, and moreover that ‘…transcendental schematism determines the essence of ontological knowledge.’ Ibid. 94, 110. 25 S\n\n<sup>25</sup> See Kant, CPR, A82/B108, 213.\n\n<sup>26</sup> Ibid. A144/B184, 275.\n\n<sup>27</sup> Ibid. A146/B185, 276.\n\n19","previous_page":18,"next_page":20}