{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":33,"pdf_page":37,"physical_index":37,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"cb1e3c3cc2697aa4eddf8edb28248cda0546024eeb9d90b5f756dead684dc82f"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"The question now is: do the other decisive aspects of the materialist concept of history reframe, modify and expand this temporality of the first historical act? Do these aspects add a new dimension to this temporal reading of the materialist concept of history? Marx’s concept of need is undoubtedly a cornerstone of his transhistorical concept of wealth [Reichtum], such that the dialecticisation of need in The German Ideology provides wealth with its overriding structure of historical measure. In Marx, following Hegel, to dialecticise is to historicalise: the economic is a category of the philosophy of history because the social production of the means of life is internally – and dialectically so – differentiated between the creation of the means to satisfy existing needs and the creation of new needs. To dialecticise is also to temporalise: if ‘time’ is the name of the abstract unity of the past, the present and the future, temporalisation is the active production of the dynamic relations between these coordinates because practice and labour are – from the very outset – dialectical concepts in Marx. However, need does not, unto itself, exhaust the philosophical scope of the economic. The creation of the means of life is of course the social creation of the means of life, such that the kinds of relations that govern this creation also govern the temporal and historical intelligibility of ‘means’ and ‘life’ alike. Additionally, despite the fact that the means of life have now been investigated in relation to need, it is crucial to expand on the philosophical character of these means, such that they and the needs they satisfy can be understood as productive forces [Produktivkräfte]. This must be done if, on some level, ‘history’ for Marx is the dialectical correspondence [Entsprechung] of the economic subject to itself, if, in other words, it is the ongoing creation of new needs and the expansion of productive forces corresponding to this creation. Simply put, we have arrived at the essential contradiction between productive forces and the ‘form’, ‘means’ and ‘relations of intercourse’ [Verkehrsform, Verkehrsmittel, Verkehrsverhältnisse, respectively], each of which prefigure the place of the ‘relations of production’ [Produktionsverhältnisse] in Marx’s philosophy of history more generally.<sup>62</sup>\n\n<sup>61</sup> Biological reproduction can be made to fit within the framework of this twofold temporality. As regards the relationship between biological, social and historical time in Marx, it is worthwhile perhaps to rework the famous passage from the Introduction to the ‘B’ (or 1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and to suggest that ‘…although all social and historical time commences with biological time, …it does not on that account all arise from biological time’ (cf. ‘…although all our cognition commences with experience, …it does not on that account all arise from experience’ Kant, CPR, B 1- 2, 136.) This move fundamentally inverts Kant: it imposes the a posteriori – or social and historical time in Marx – on Kant’s a priori, whilst holding on to the necessary and universal character exclusive to this a priori. The same manoeuvre is made in the next chapter, in relation to Heidegger’s practical philosophy.\n\n33","previous_page":32,"next_page":34}