{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":49,"pdf_page":53,"physical_index":53,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"4b28321423579e359c8370430fd62771d2d99b492b60089908d78a914bb9de81"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"Heidegger’s notion of world is structured by a complex relationship to the necessity and universality of a priori synthetic judgements in Kant. <sup>34</sup> On one level, Heidegger is faithful to Kant, even as he expands and recodes the divisions within Kant’s transcendental logic through his own framework of ontological difference (the difference, that is to say, between being and entity). As Heidegger states: ‘…in the problem of a priori synthetic judgements still another type of synthesis is concerned which must bring something forth about the entity not first derived from it through experience. This bringing forth of the determination of the being of the entity is a precursory act of reference to the entity. This pure ‘reference-to…’ (synthesis) first constitutes the direction and the horizon within which the entity is first capable of being experienced in the empirical synthesis.’<sup>35</sup> And yet, Being and Time makes clear – even if it is not explicitly stated by Heidegger – that an internal difference within one of the coordinates of ontological difference creates a tension with the function of ontological difference as the condition of possibility of a priori synthetic judgements. This is because the existence of a particular entity (more specifically, the understanding ability-to-be of Dasein) is itself the condition of the intelligibility of the being of any entity. Dasein is an ‘ontically distinctive entity because ‘it is ontological.’<sup>36</sup> It is an entity whose very being makes being ‘an issue’ for it, and this being towards which it comports itself is what Heidegger formally designates as ‘existence’. Dasein’s existence (which in Heidegger is the ontological meaning of experience) is the condition of possibility of a priori synthetic judgements, be they existential (‘precursory acts of reference’) or cognitive judgements. Specifically, being-in-the-world is this condition: ‘…being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori.’<sup>37</sup> Consequently, Heidegger’s concept of world significantly modifies the contours of purity in Kant, such that (1) existence, the essential being of Dasein, can be ontologically disclosed as originary only if no cognition is, to borrow Kant’s term in the Critique of Pure Reason, first ‘intermixed’; and (2) cognition is absolutely dependent on empirical acts and experiences within the world. In this regard, Heidegger’s stated desire to enact a transition from ‘pre-ontology’ to ‘fundamental ontology’ in Being and Time engenders the possibility, to repeat a manoeuvre in the previous chapter<sup>38</sup>, of reconstructing a decisive passage from the introduction to the ‘B’ edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in the following manner: ‘…although all our existence commences with cognition, …it does not on that account all arise from cognition.’<sup>39</sup> As with Marx and Engels’s first historical act, Heidegger’s ‘world’ imposes the a posteriori, which is to say experience and the empirical, on Kant’s a priori whilst holding on to the necessary and universal character exclusive to this a priori. This is, in Marx and Heidegger alike, a distinctly temporal exclusivity. In Marx, this is the sense in which the ‘creation of fresh life’ – as one domain of the biological – wholly depends on social and historical time for its intelligibility. In Heidegger, this is how the temporal character of the ‘earlier’, the ‘in advance’, the ‘prior’, the ‘beforehand’, etc. must be read<sup>40</sup>, along with the temporality of necessity and universality more generally: ‘in each case’ through facticity and finitude. The key issue here is that Dasein registers a basic tension within ontology itself: the a priori is conceivable only when Dasein as an existential analytic preconditions Dasein as a self-understanding (‘existentiell’) entity, and yet only this self-understanding, only Dasein’s ontical affairs, secures being-in-the-world as the necessary and universal makeup of the a priori. The importance that Heidegger attaches to the world is beyond dispute: ‘…Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already to a “world” which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its being.’<sup>41</sup>\n\n<sup>33</sup> Ibid. 119.\n\n<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, BT, 67.\n\n<sup>34</sup> Most basically, Heidegger suggests that ‘Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to the question: “How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?”’ Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 18.\n\n<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 20. ‘Entity’ used in lieu of Churchill’s translation of ‘Seiendes’ as ‘essent’.\n\n49","previous_page":48,"next_page":50}