{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":50,"pdf_page":54,"physical_index":54,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"3d21a29745d585c8def778ef3a4a1c6c656d9b062e98768beb9b3f717296b25c"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, BT, 32.\n\n<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 79.\n\n<sup>38</sup> See footnote 62 in Chapter 1.\n\n<sup>39</sup> Once again: ‘But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience.’ Kant, CPR, B 1-2, 136.\n\n<sup>40</sup> ‘Can the a priori which in the tradition of ontology is held to be a characteristic of the determination of being be explained by asserting that the ‘earlier’ which it implies ‘naturally’ has nothing to do with ‘time’? Certainly, it has nothing to do with the ‘time’ recognized by the ordinary comprehension of time. But is this ‘earlier’ positively determined thereby, and is this annoying temporal character pushed aside? Or does it not reappear as a new and more difficult problem?’ Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 249.\n\n50","previous_page":49,"next_page":51}