{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":51,"pdf_page":55,"physical_index":55,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"44e5483f2aeb4cb074613a7afe33018043a06ffa62fcbbd561591dd550a6f849"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"We must now address the question of the relationship between Dasein and individual human beings (entities), because this question grounds any attempt to develop a ‘framework for dialogue’<sup>42</sup> between Dasein and Marx’s conception of the human more generally. This framework is, this thesis argues, a vital (and to date unexplored) aspect of what Heidegger in his 1949 ‘Letter on Humanism’ calls ‘the historical in being’, that dimension of being within which, for Heidegger, a ‘productive dialogue’ between phenomenology and existentialism, on the one hand, and Marxism, on the other, ‘first becomes possible.’<sup>43</sup> The crux of the matter – the condition of this framework – is the possible conjunction (but by no means unity) between the individuation of Dasein in Being and Time and the social individuation of the human in Marx. The problem of individuation is at the heart ofBeing and Time: from the outset, Dasein is not just nor immediately presented as an individual.<sup>44</sup> A pivotal part of the contribution that ‘being-in-the-world’ makes to the philosophy of the subject is its irreducibility to individual human entities. However, this is not to accept the terms of Heidegger’s understanding of this contribution, i.e. the notion that being-in-the-world is a new kind of subjectivity because it completely evades the ‘common, subjectivistic concept of “subject”.’<sup>45</sup> On one level, Dasein is not a substantial (present-at-hand), thinking ‘I-thing’ [Ichding] outfitted with a body; it is not a (conventionally rendered) Cartesian subject. But on another level, it must be this subject. It must, on Heidegger’s own terms, be this concept of the individual consistent with the (so to speak) common, individualistic concept of the ‘individual’. As we will see, this need not be a problem for Being and Time, even if Heidegger creates it as one. Being-in-the-world is not an ‘originary existentiale’ in isolation from ‘world-historical happening’ [weltgeschichtliches Geschehen], but Heidegger precludes the possibility that the ontological structure of this happening might (and on his own terms need) structure the Seinsfrage itself (the question of the meaning of being in general). The issue here, first of all, is that the ontological structure of world-historical happening (in Marx and Heidegger alike) constitutes the existence of the isolated and alienated – which is to say the ‘common’ – individual.\n\n<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, BT, 120-21. ‘The world is therefore something “wherein” Dasein as an entity already was.’ Ibid. 106. As Macquarrie and Robinson note, Heidegger’s use of angewiesen (‘submitted’) and Angewiesenheit (‘submission’) in this passage simultaneously means to assign, to allot, to depend on and to be at the mercy of something. Ibid. 121.\n\n<sup>42</sup> See David Schweickart, ‘Heidegger and Marx: A Framework for Dialogue’, in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 229-43. Whilst individual labour does not figure in his account, Schweickart persuasively analyses how Heidegger’s critique of Marxism as a humanist (which for Heidegger = metaphysical) discourse in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ enriches our understanding of liberatory praxis.\n\n<sup>43</sup> Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ [1949], trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks [1967], ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 259. For Heidegger, since ‘estrangement attains an essential dimension of history’ in Marx, ‘the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts.’ Ibid.\n\n<sup>44</sup> Consider the following passage: ‘Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation.’ Heidegger, BT, 62.\n\n<sup>45</sup> Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic [1928], trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 195. See as well Einar Øverenget, Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 103. In the Leibniz lectures, Heidegger problematically reads the transcendental subject in Kant, and the a priori which it activates, as ‘worldless’, so as to clear space for ‘being-in-the-world…[to] fundamentally transform the concept[s] of subjectivity and…the subjective.’ Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 195.\n\n51","previous_page":50,"next_page":52}