{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":52,"pdf_page":56,"physical_index":56,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d578086fe7a00ea7e9ad478583c620c1eadc689ffadbbc3f42cbed26188c7ecf"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"Akin to Wilhelm Dilthey’s ‘life-nexus’, what is pre-given in Being and Time is Dasein’s being-in-the-world, not its individualised existence (for its part, the pre-givenness of Husserl’s ‘lifeworld’ in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) derives from Heidegger’s ‘world’). Being-in-the-world is ontologically prior to the individual; it is only from being-in-the-world that Dasein as an individual entity first becomes possible. In Heidegger, to render Dasein as a pre-existing individual is to render it as originally presentat-hand, a fallacy that reverberates with Lukács’s position in History and Class Consciousness (1923) that the ‘individual subject’ is quite simply the product of the generalised reification of social relations.<sup>46</sup> In fact, much of the scholarship in the American analytical tradition also maintains that Dasein cannot be reduced to discrete human entities, that there is, in other words, no ‘separate and unique Dasein for each person.’<sup>47</sup> In his analysis of the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, Charles Guignon emphasises Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is ‘not the egotistical person, not the ontically isolated individual.’<sup>48</sup> For Guignon, ‘in the description of everyday being-in-the-world, what emerges is a picture of Dasein which is closer to Dilthey’s conception of “objective mind” than it is to the Cartesian subject or a monad…there is no plural for “Dasein”, and Heidegger seldom speaks of “a Dasein”. “Dasein” is not a “count noun” that ranges over particular individuals, but is more like a “mass noun”. It captures the idea of a “clearing” of intelligibility which can more properly be understood as a cultural totality than as a collection of individuals.’<sup>49</sup> Carol White maintains that Dasein is first and foremost the entity we all are: it is what we share in common. This is the sense in which the individual is, following Marx, the bearer – the personification – of Dasein. The relationship between Dasein and the human is ‘graphically ontological’: ‘we are the entity through whom what it is “to be”…is revealed, and thus we are the “there”…where Being is disclosed.’<sup>50</sup> The structuralist overtones here are obvious. White attributes the predominant misreading of the individuation of Dasein to translation. She is explicitly critical of Macquarrie and Robinson’s continual pluralisation of Heidegger’s collective singular term ‘das Seiende’ (entity or whatis). Thus, ‘“das Seiende…sind wir je selbst” becomes “we are ourselves the entities” and “das Sein des Seienden” becomes “the Being of entities”.’<sup>51</sup> For White, the individuation of Dasein denotes the demarcation of Dasein from other domains of what-is, such that its being cannot be confused with that of other entity. Individuation is the constitution of Dasein’s existential self as itself, radically situating the ‘there’ of Dasein. It is only because of this individuation that one individual can be differentiated from another. Is it possible to suggest, therefore, that Dasein is originarily a social rather than individual entity?\n\n<sup>46</sup> Highlighting §10 and §83 in Being and Time, where Heidegger explicitly discusses the reification of consciousness, Lucien Goldmann provocatively suggests that Being and Time is a direct (and yet unacknowledged) response to Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness. Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy [1973], trans. William Q. Boelhower (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 27-39. Goldmann’s understanding of Heidegger is suspect, but it is certainly possible that Heidegger’s derivation of the ‘present-at-hand’ from the ‘ready-to-hand’ could be cross-read with Lukács’s account of reification as yielded by the instrumental rationality of capitalist social relations.\n\n<sup>47</sup> John Haugeland, ‘Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism’, in Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Vol. 1, ed. Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000), 46.\n\n<sup>48</sup> Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz [1928], in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 2: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 172.\n\n52","previous_page":51,"next_page":53}