{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":53,"pdf_page":57,"physical_index":57,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"66d1d3ded1fbf009929400445b5a21b8f4ce7cb32d8ef7f8f58cd7a2ea635fda"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"These are convincing readings of Heidegger, but they must be squared with Heidegger’s constitution of Dasein as a social entity, such that an individual Dasein [ein einzelnes Dasein] – an entity which definitely figures in Being and Time – encounters what Heidegger calls ‘the others’. On the surface, the category of ‘the social’ rarely appears in Being and Time. In its place, catalysed by the question of ‘who’ Dasein is in its everydayness, Heidegger presents two existentiale as ‘equi-originary’ [gleichursprünglich] with being-in-the-world: ‘beingwith’ and ‘Dasein-with’.<sup>52</sup> For Heidegger, being-in-the-world is being-with others: ‘the world is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world.’<sup>53</sup> The others are intraworldly entities. They are confronted in the ‘environmental context of equipment’, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ structure which grounds the world as a referential totality of signifying actions. Put differently, the encounter with the others is fundamentally enabled by what Heidegger designates as the ‘ready-to-hand’, an entity whose essential being (‘readinessto-hand’) is defined by an ‘assignment’ or ‘involvement’ within-the-world. The ready-to-hand is not defined by being a tangible object in space (this is the present-at-hand), but rather by its practical relation to the world. This brings us to Heidegger’s formal definition of the others:\n\n<sup>49</sup> Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 104.\n\n<sup>50</sup> Carol J. White, ‘Dasein, Existence, and Death’, in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), 333. <sup>51</sup> Ibid. 332. Emphasis added. Macquarrie and Robinson frequently interject ‘one’ and ‘one’s’ into their translation where ‘one’ [man] and ‘one’s’ [eigenen] do not appear in the German original, effectively compelling the English-language reader to comprehend Dasein as only an individual and not also a transindividual entity. To name two examples: ‘einen Ausstand an Seinkönnen’ becomes ‘something still outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-Being’ (Heidegger, BT, 279) and ‘Endlichkeit der Existenz becomes ‘finitude of one’s existence’ (ibid. 435). However, it is crucial to note that ‘one’ and ‘one’s’ regularly appear in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s sociality. Thus ‘Mitsein ist eine Bestimmtheit des je eigenen Daseins’ is accurately rendered as ‘Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein’ (ibid. 157). Emphases added.\n\n53","previous_page":52,"next_page":54}