{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":56,"pdf_page":60,"physical_index":60,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1a61ef54a238959b15429ff58aa149a23f382d58166279d0484ff557b46c01be"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"The possibility of a philosophical correspondence between Being and Time and Marx’s analyses of capitalist alienation is beginning to emerge, and this is all the more evident with the third point of resonance. To be clear, this point is only secured by modifying Heidegger in the direction of Marx, but it is all the more productive because of this. There is a conjunction between Marx’s phenomenology of the alienation of the worker from both the product of his labour and from other workers, such that these become objective things divorced from and hostile to him, and Heidegger’s account of an everyday absorption in the world which ‘leaps over’ the world and relegates it to a pre-ontological thing. Crucially, this conjunction traverses the two primary and interdependent articulations of ‘world’ in Being and Time: the ready-tohand within the world of circumspective concern [das Umwelt], as well as the world of public interaction between one individual Dasein and another, which is to say the ‘with-world’ of solicitude [Fürsorge]. In Heidegger, the reification [Verdinglichung, literally ‘thingification’] of the world of circumspective concern comes to the fore with what he calls the ‘un-ready-tohand’, an entity which is ‘not missing at all and not unusable’,<sup>61</sup> but which, and here we must realign Heidegger towards Marx, does not ‘stand in the way’ of Dasein’s concern. This is because concern – the existential register of the activity which Dasein performs and the things which this activity procures – is, at the level of individuals, overtly and covertly forced upon Dasein. Against Heidegger, Dasein’s assignment is explicit precisely because this assignment has not been disturbed.<sup>62</sup> This non-disturbance is a class concern. Within capitalism, it is the exclusive belonging – ownership – of the ready-to-hand whose worldly character ‘announces itself’ as what might be described as a ‘useful presence-at-hand’ (the ready-to-hand qua the un-ready-to-hand). In his reading of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marcuse grasps this subjection to the thing as the economic manifestation of an originary lack of Dasein. For Marcuse, Dasein’s being always exceeds its existence, rendering its labour a futile attempt to realise its capacity for self-fulfilment. Therefore labour is, as he puts it, inescapably ‘burdensome’: ‘in labour it is always first a question of the thing itself and not of the labourer, even when a complete separation between labour and the “product of labour” has not yet taken place. In labour the human is always taken away from its self-being and toward something else: it is always with an other and for an other.’<sup>63</sup> It is necessary to read ‘the thing’ in the Marcuse passage as both the product of labour and the other worker in Marx, and as the being of both the ready-to-hand and ‘the other’ in Heidegger. Herein lies the relevance of Heidegger’s concept of solicitude to Marx. Solicitude ‘throws’ the other out of his ‘position’ and dictates that with which he is concerned.<sup>64</sup> Heidegger acknowledges solicitude to be a relation of dependence, and, in a rare moment of political economic insight, a ‘being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair…[that] thrives only on mistrust.’<sup>65</sup> Whilst he never establishes the connection, solicitude (in its indifferent and deficient modes) is the objectification of the other as a tangible thing. The ‘one’ may be ‘as little present-at-hand as Dasein itself,’ yet the ‘the being of those entities which are there with us gets conceived as presence-at-hand.’<sup>66</sup>\n\n<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 103.\n\n<sup>60</sup> Heidegger, BT, 167.\n\n<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 105.\n\n56","previous_page":55,"next_page":57}