{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":57,"pdf_page":61,"physical_index":61,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b0cc1902c84f431c6a95eae6ffe9a4468c55c4a0c3903f4a142c5953e858d0ce"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"Transposing this dialogue between Marx and Heidegger to the philosophy of time now requires that Dasein’s structural whole [Ganze] be investigated. At the end of the first division of Being and Time, ‘care’ [Sorge] emerges as the totalised manifold of existence which simultaneously refigures existence as ‘existentiality’. Care is formally defined as follows: ‘the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in (the world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).’<sup>67</sup> For Heidegger, existence, facticity and falling are the ontological characteristics of Dasein which ‘weave together’ the originary context of care, to which disclosedness and truth – and their articulation through discourse and language – essentially belong.<sup>68</sup> As previously considered, existence is constituted by understanding, an ability-to-be which in turn is structured by projection upon possibilities and the interpretation (the ‘working out’) of these possibilities. Facticity is the affective determinacy of Dasein. It is not the brute ‘factuality’ of something present-at-hand, but rather an actuality marked by a ‘disposedness’ which discloses Dasein in its essential ‘thrownness’. An existential fact that is never settled nor finished, thrownness reveals that Dasein has already always been ‘delivered over’ to being-in-the-world, even if, and in fact precisely because, Dasein ‘initially and for the most part’ evades this fact. ‘Falling’ fills out Heidegger’s notion of care. If existence is the domain of ‘being-ahead’ and facticity that of being-already-in the world, falling is the ‘beingalongside’ or ‘being-amidst’ entities encountered within-the-world. Falling is constituted by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. As being-in-the-world, it is also temptation, tranquillity and estrangement (falling is the only stated place of estrangement in Being and Time). Reminiscent of the ‘fundamental premise of private property’ for Marx, the fact that the human ‘produces only in order to have’<sup>69</sup>, falling is for Heidegger a ‘downward plunge’ whose ‘tranquillised supposition’ is that ‘it possesses everything…that everything is in reach.’<sup>70</sup> An existentiale directly linked to the sociality of the one, falling is, for this reason, the primary point of entry into Heidegger’s two existentiell modes of being: authenticity/ownedness [Eigentlichkeit] and inauthenticity/unownedness [Uneigentlichkeit], wherein the latter is not (purportedly) a fall from the purer and higher state of the former, but an ontologically basic fascination with the world and the one, a positive possibility of Dasein’s ‘not-being-its-self’.<sup>71</sup>\n\n<sup>63</sup> Herbert Marcuse, ‘On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics’, [1933] trans. John Abromeit, in Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, 130. Douglas Kellner also translates this essay in Telos 16 (Summer 1973), 9-37. There is clearly an ontological individualism in this essay. <sup>64</sup> Heidegger, BT, 158, 161. This is misleadingly characterised as an ‘extreme possibility’ of solicitude, but in fact constitutes the phenomenological core of its ‘indifferent’ and ‘deficient’ modes. <sup>65</sup> Ibid. 159.\n\n<sup>66</sup> Ibid. 166, 168.\n\n<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 237.\n\n<sup>68</sup> If disclosedness (understanding, disposedness, falling) ‘maintains its articulation through discourse’ (Heidegger, SZ, 461/BT, 400), and if ‘discourse is existentially equi-originary with disposedness and understanding’ (Heidegger, SZ, 213/BT, 203), is it justifiable to suggest that, even if ‘discourse in itself is temporal,’ it ‘does not temporalise itself primarily in any definite ecstasis’ (Heidegger, BT, 400)? Is Heidegger’s transposition (as we will later consider) of understanding as the future, disposedness as beenness, and falling as making present not woven together with an ecstasis (if not a temporality) specific to Articulation itself? It never made its way into the final manuscript, but Heidegger’s temporalisation of language and speech in the ‘first draft’ of Being and Time addresses this. See Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time (The First Draft of Being and Time) [1924], trans. Ingo Farin (London: Continuum, 2011), 63. This text should not be confused with his Marburg Theological\n\n57","previous_page":56,"next_page":58}