{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":60,"pdf_page":64,"physical_index":64,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"51d60242b84369837a218c2d27126c3b7147da11a7ce3cea4937b6275961fa40"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"There is a complex philosophical appropriation of the conceptual lineage of the limit at work here. As with Heidegger’s reconstruction of the purity of a priori synthetic judgements through his conception of world, this appropriation begins with Kant, although its relation to being-towards-death stems from the (for Heidegger) underdeveloped difference between the whole and the sum in Plato and Aristotle.83 There are different but overlapping dimensions to this appropriation whose shared origin is arguably the systematic distinction between the limit and the barrier [Schranke] within Kant’s critical philosophy. For Kant, ‘limits…always presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses that location; barriers require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness.’84 Unlike mathematics and the natural sciences, the ‘dialectical endeavours of pure reason’ within metaphysics lead to limits whose transgression (qua transcendental ideas) ‘cannot be avoided and yet will never be realised.’85 In Heidegger, the existential rendition of this comes by way of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and Jasper’s conception of the ‘limit-situation’ [Grenzsituation] in his Psychology of Worldviews (1919), which Heidegger footnotes.86 Specifically, it is the towards within beingtowards-the-end, such that anxiety ‘amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end’87, which existentially registers the unavoidability and yet actual impossibility of death. To put it another way, the anxiety inherent within being-towardsdeath corresponds to and yet critically modifies the function of the limit in Kant: corresponds to, because the limit (death) which begets this anxiety is certain and yet unrealisable; critically modifies, because the transgression of this limit in Heidegger is only ever a being-towards the limit, such that anxiety is not generated beyond the phenomenal realm of time and space but is rather only ever being-in-the-world itself.88 Against Kant’s transcendental idea, therefore, being-towards-death is not illusory or deceptive (at least, that is, in its ‘authentic’ mode).\n\n78 Ibid. 288. ‘…the “lack of totality in Dasein, the constant “ahead-of-itself”, is neither something still outstanding in a summative togetherness, nor something which has not yet become accessible. It is a “not-yet” which any Dasein, as the entity which it is, has to be.’ Ibid.\n\n79 As we will examine, this is also the unique manner in which Heidegger ties temporalisation to the basic teleological structure of action by way of the concept of finitude [Endlichkeit], that ‘characteristic of temporalisation itself’ (ibid. 378). It is the limit – qua the finitude of temporality – which secures being-towards-death as the existential ground of temporalisation.\n\n80 White, ‘Dasein, Existence, and Death’, 338.\n\n81 Carol J. White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2005), 79.\n\n82 William Blattner, ‘The Concept of Death in Being and Time’, in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), 325. Blattner stresses the centrality of anxiety [Angst] to Heidegger’s analysis of death, although in a very curious fashion. On his reading, anxiety is not a disposedness in line with anticipatory beingtowards-death, as Heidegger argues, but death as such. In other words, Blattner expresses the idea that death is actually a possible way to be Dasein (in which Dasein is unable to be). Death, it seems, is akin to an anxiety attack. It is a state in which the ability-to-be is stifled. His metaphor for this is as follows: ‘in the absence of light, the ability-to-see is not non-existent, it is simply stifled.’ Ibid. To Blattner’s credit, he carefully reconstructs Heidegger’s nuanced understanding of the end, drawing on Jasper’s concept of the limit-situation, in order to evade any sense of the end as ‘stopping’. However, his idea that death is a situation that ‘occurs’ when Dasein is beset by anxiety, in which none of its possibilities matter to it whatsoever, does little else but flatten the crucial importance of anticipation.\n\n83 Heidegger, BT, 288, ft. iii (494).\n\n60","previous_page":59,"next_page":61}