{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":68,"pdf_page":72,"physical_index":72,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d2943a561c5f09443219c5a6bf536da533342166ca18db41f9e2d4837e2dd1f7"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"A couple of notes about this diagram. First, it transforms what Heidegger refers to as a ‘derivative time’ (wherein the priority of the future still holds)<sup>115</sup> into a logic of derivation which extends across the entirety of Being and Time. This is a tripartite structure of existential derivation whose model is the ‘degeneration’ of originary temporality into world-time, and world-time into ordinary time<sup>116</sup>, but as a structure it is not reducible to time. Second, to be faithful (for now) to Heidegger, the vertical and hierarchical orientation of derivation in this diagram is better imag(in)ed on a horizontal and non-evaluative plane, consistent with the idea that time (originary temporality, world-time and ordinary time) is the transcendental horizon for ‘any understanding whatsoever’ of being.<sup>117</sup> Consequently, authenticity and inauthenticity are written across the entire structure. Originary temporality is not the sole domain of authentic temporality; namely, originary temporality ≠ authentic temporality. After Blattner, originary temporality in Being and Time is ‘modally indifferent’ to authenticity and inauthenticity: ‘authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality.’<sup>118</sup> Hence world-time and ordinary time are not necessarily inauthentic. Strictly speaking, it is possible that world-time and ordinary time can be taken hold of as Dasein’s ‘own’ in such a way that they become ‘an existentiell modification of the “one”’ which ‘frees the other in his freedom for himself.’<sup>119</sup> Conversely, originary temporality repeatedly loses itself in the one and becomes ‘completely fascinated by the “world” and by the Dasein-with of others in the “one”.’<sup>120</sup> For Heidegger, a binding identity between one form of time and one existentiell mode of being, a fixed identity between, say, ordinary time and inauthenticity, flattens the essential difference between the ontological and the ontic because it immobilises – it absolutises – Dasein’s relationship to its own being. But what explains the convergence between one form of time and one existentiell mode of being? What mediates their relationship, such that there is, as there is in Heidegger, an ‘originary and authentic temporality’ and an ‘ordinary and inauthentic time’? How do we account for the fact that the temporal relationship between the originary and the authentic, and that between the ordinary and the inauthentic, has the capacity to change? These questions, which Heidegger does not address, refresh the larger problem of the relationship between the ontological and the ontic in Being and Time, a problem only intensified by the fact that Dasein is ‘ontically distinctive’ because it is ontological.\n\n<sup>115</sup> Heidegger, BT, 378.\n\n<sup>116</sup> William Blattner, ‘Temporality’, in A Companion To Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 318. See Heidegger, BT, 383, where degeneration is linked to the notion of ‘springing-from’.\n\n<sup>117</sup> ‘Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being.’ Ibid. 19. This is an understanding of time as that which exceeds and transgresses (from the Latin transcendere) as well, as previously mentioned, as limits, surrounds and encloses (from the Greek horizein). This is Dasein as a ‘transcendental horizon’: ‘Dasein’s selfhood does not imply a substantial centre from which the transcending movement is supposed to start, but is, on the contrary, founded upon transcendence itself – as the condition of its very possibility.’ Françoise Dastur, ‘The Ekstatico-Horizonal Constitution of Temporality’, in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1, Philosophy, ed. Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), 174. Heidegger’s transcendental horizon is indebted to the temporalising structure of ‘transcendence in immanence’ in Husserlian phenomenology, from which Nancy’s idea of art as ‘transimmanence’ equally departs. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses [1994], trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 34-5. <sup>118</sup> Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 99.\n\n<sup>119</sup> Heidegger, BT, 168, 159.\n\n<sup>120</sup> Ibid. 220.\n\n68","previous_page":67,"next_page":69}