{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","id":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","uuid":"cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":216,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/cfa147d3-494e-49cc-b356-7aceff50b181/search"},"page":{"printed_page":74,"pdf_page":78,"physical_index":78,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"4483576e9563fd5b3326bd6f8d1cdd6f57910905c0c61b5319aa5edf1dba15a1"},"chapter":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","content":"This leads to a second – and even more ontologically basic – problem with Heidegger’s philosophy of history. At the heart of the lack of a sustainable concept of the act and the origin in Being and Time is a systematic lack of a concept of need. This lack is all the more glaring because there is an unacknowledged yet undeniable dependence on a discourse of need which cuts across the existential analytic of Dasein. On Heidegger’s own terms, Dasein needs the world: its very possibility of existence, its very understanding ability-to-be, is absolutely impossible in isolation from being-in-the-world. The a priority of the world is beyond dispute. Yet this foundational need is only thematised in passing: we ‘need’ the ready-to-hand when it is understood to be missing, when it has become the ‘un-ready-to-hand’; the temporality of circumspective concern confers meaning to our ‘everyday needs’.<sup>141</sup> There is exactly one passage in Being and Time, included in Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘temporal problem of the transcendence of the world’, which expresses the ontological centrality of need: ‘Dasein exists for the sake of an ability-to-be of itself. In existing, it has been thrown, and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs [es bedarf] in order to be able to be as it is – namely, for the sake of itself.’<sup>142</sup> But what are these entities which Dasein needs? What structures the relationship between Dasein and the world as a relationship of need? The answer, in short, is the ready-to-hand. The ontological structure of the ready-to-hand grounds Dasein as an entity already always in a certain practical relation to a particular world. The ready-to-hand defines being-in-the-world as a practical relation, and it is precisely this relation which differentiates the ready-to-hand from the present-at-hand.<sup>143</sup> As Mark Okrent puts it, ‘the whole difference between the ready-to-hand and the extant is that to be an extant being of a certain type is to be capable of effects that make no reference to potential ends.’<sup>144</sup> What the ready-to-hand draws attention to is the fact that the existential analytic of Dasein does not just rethink the teleological structure of the act through the end of praxis, but that the end of the act is defined by an indissociable connection between praxis and poiêsis. Dasein’s being is praxis, as Franco Volpi and others have demonstrated<sup>145</sup>, but it is equally poiêsis (from the standpoint, that is, of the production of necessary objects for use, not the objects themselves). Heidegger’s philosophy of time implicitly registers this. As Blatter reminds us, there is no difference between the ‘world-time now-structure’ and the originary present within originary temporality: the former is embedded within originary temporality as one of its three ecstasies (the ecstatic present offalling).<sup>146</sup> Yet Heidegger’s philosophy of history explicitly rejects this. As previously alluded to, Heidegger declares that the ‘ontological structure of world-historical happening’ (the happening of worldly entities other than Dasein which are historical) must be excluded from ‘the ontological enigma of the movement of happening in general.’<sup>147</sup> This is an exclusion which – not without irony – conditions Schürmann’s insistence that ‘ontology originarily’ and the ‘origin ontologically’ are inseparable. It is an exclusion which contradicts Heidegger’s claim that historicality is just the ‘concrete working out’ of originary temporality. Yet the problem is not contradiction as such, but rather the specific ahistorical – or better, the specific de-historicalising – a priority of the world which this contradiction reveals.\n\n<sup>138</sup> In repetition, Dasein’s birth ‘is caught up into its existence in coming back from the possibility of death (the possibility which cannot be surpassed)…’ Heidegger, SZ, 516 (BT, 443). Simply put, Dasein can ‘catch up’ with its birth – but not its death – in anticipatory resoluteness.\n\n<sup>139</sup> Were it to be developed, the ‘pure facticity’ of birth would need to be theorised in relation to the factical domain of being-towards-death, which is to say the particular limit specific to each and every act.\n\n<sup>140</sup> Consider the temporality of this passage by Lisa Guenther: ‘I suggest that a rigorous distinction must be made between the originating possibility of birth and all the other possibilities granted to me at birth, in order to mark the ontological distinction between the unrepeatable, deeply passive, and irreducibly past possibility of birth, and the heritage of repeatable possibilities given to me at birth. What is at stake in this distinction? On one hand, understood strictly as an ontological limit, birth grants me the sheer possibility of existence; on the other hand, and at the same time, birth grants all the traditions, practices, languages, and other possibilities that together form a heritage that is received but must also be chosen.’ Lisa Guenther, ‘Being-from-others: Reading Heidegger after Cavarero’, Hypatia 23:1 (January-March 2008), 106.\n\n74","previous_page":73,"next_page":75}