{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":14,"pdf_page":19,"physical_index":19,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b31a86623e372fd86092892113f7136b2cde074ee6b172c7b9f607451aefd8e8"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"While Trump did reach a temporary trade accord with Xi Jinping’s administration, the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted its implementation and relations collapsed. The Biden administration essentially embraced the Trumpian worldview, systematizing Trump’s piecemeal initiatives into an increasingly comprehensive framework aimed at limiting China’s integration with the global economic order, and maintaining US dominance in strategic high-technology sectors (Leoni, 2022). Trump’s return in 2025 simply signalled the death knell for any hope of a reversion in US policy.\n\nThe scope for a reduction in geopolitical tension appears limited. Both the United States and China have deployed expansive state capitalist practices towards the rivalry, in ways which have permanently reconfigured the dynamics of their economies. China’s party-state has deepened its reach across its economy, by expanding the influence of SOEs and in deepening control mechanisms over the private sector (Liu and Tsai, 2021; Pearson et al., 2021). Meanwhile, the United States has moved in a similar direction, albeit within ideological constraints imposed by its political system. Starrs and Germann (2021) observe sweeping changes in (1) the US tariff regime, designed to target Chinese imports in particular; (2) the inward investment regime, aimed at restricting Chinese firms’ access to high-tech US companies; and (3) export regulations, which use technology export bans to target Chinese firms like ZTE and Huawei. Heightened local procurement requirements have also been enacted through the reformed implementation of the Buy American Act, alongside evidence for a growing consensus on the value of state-led investments in strategic technology development and mission-oriented development projects in areas such as supply-chain reshoring and 5 G provision (Baltz, 2022).\n\nBut despite recent ructions caused by the second Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs, the costs of full economic decoupling between the US and China seem to remain prohibitive (Rosen and Gloudeman, 2021) – both for the economies themselves, and for third countries. The ‘new state capitalism’, far from autarchic, is instead substantially geared towards the establishment of control over the transnational networks that constitute the architecture of globalization (Schindler et al., 2023). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, has extended China’s reach across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America through a sweeping range of state-backed infrastructural investment and development financing initiatives. The BRI has in turn prompted the entry of the US government directly into the infrastructure financing space with its Development Finance Corporation and the nascent US-led G7 ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment’ (PGII). So far, it these initiatives are much smaller than the BRI, and they have also failed to meet their modest objectives (Schindler and Kanai, 2021; Hameiri and Jones, 2024). Nevertheless, this competition to coordinate the build-out ofphysical infrastructure is increasingly tied to a related, and equally intense, competition over digital technologies.\n\n14\n\nReinventing Capitalism","previous_page":13,"next_page":15}