{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":17,"pdf_page":22,"physical_index":22,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"89aedb77cb88a8d0c83dbcf36d831fcf0cb6dfca1c8177198addfbe95088e5b1"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"Broadly speaking, the open architecture of a platform constitutes a coreperiphery model, in which core technologies are under the direct control of the platform firm, while third-party designers generate complementary innovations (Rodon Modol and Eaton, 2021). External developers’ (complementors) innovations further enhance network and lock-in effects. The Apple Store, for instance, relies on third-party companies to build the majority of iOS apps which make the iPhone a useful and attractive device. But because platform firms maintain ownership of and control over their cores, they retain the authority and capacity to rewrite the rules (protocols) through which ecosystem users interact (Galloway, 2004). A core goal of platform protocol is to prevent so-called ‘multihoming’ and deepen user lock-in via technical means. Consequently, in certain sectors platform firms have become unavoidable intermediaries, mediating the exchange of goods and services amongst users within enclosed digital spaces (Langley and Leyshon, 2017).\n\nAs a function of being unavoidable intermediaries in transactions and exchanges, platform firms are able to leverage control over protocol to influence everyday habits and practices (Grön et al., 2023). Locking users into ecosystems enables platforms to extract payment from value circulating across platform networks (Sadowski, 2020; Arboleda and Purcell, 2021), but also to write the rules by which they interact. Staab (2024) consequently argues platforms represent the rise ofprivatized marketplaces. Innovations like algorithmically generated prices and supplier rankings systems disrupt market pricing mechanisms to the extent that the integrity of public markets – the cornerstone of capitalist economies – is potentially threatened. Furthermore, platforms’ control over protocol also affords them enormous power to reshape the business processes of firms which use their infrastructure (Nowak et al., 2022). Consider, for instance, the ability of Apple to exert control over third-party apps in its App Store via terms of service.\n\nState Platform Capitalism\n\n17","previous_page":16,"next_page":18}