{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":2,"pdf_page":7,"physical_index":7,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"c7d03e4828b8a2735f9bf1981679e68f9f44e23a77b29bc6f3cf5154633f08da"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"This steady accumulation ofpower by platform firms has not gone unnoticed in the corridors of political power. But, as we aim to demonstrate, the response to growing platform power from politicians has not been entirely hostile. In addition to curtailing some of the powers their domestic platform firms wield at home, governments in Washington, Beijing, and elsewhere have concurrently sought to bolster the global standing of their largest platform firms abroad. In this way, states are beginning to recognize the large potential for multiplying their power which can derive from harnessing platform infrastructure for public ends. And although platform firms are often hostile to new regulatory initiatives and regimes, they have increasingly partnered with states because of the economic and regulatory advantages that this affords.\n\n1.2 Conflict and State Capitalism\n\nDigital platforms did not arise in a vacuum. Their rise to become global economic powerhouses was propelled by the rules and institutions that underpinned neoliberal globalization in the 1990s and 2000s. The basic principle of US power after the Cold War was to open the world’s markets ever more deeply to free flows of investment, trade, and information. With the ‘Washington Consensus’, US policymakers pushed states towards ever-greater marketization, dismantling the edifice of post-war statism, and empowering global institutions such as the WTO to invigilate these new rules. The United States privatized the networking infrastructure which had emerged through its efforts to interconnect local networks under the auspices of D/ARPA, while encouraging (through consent and coercion) third countries to follow suit (Tarnoff, 2022). The new US internet firms which emerged consolidated market power by amalgamating the hitherto local networks built up within the United States into a national ‘internet’. But they also spread rapidly across borders and markets, protected by a global IP regime and encouraged by the liberal prescriptions for the world to pursue development and growth through networked integration (embodied by the WTO’s 1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement).\n\n2\n\nReinventing Capitalism","previous_page":1,"next_page":3}