{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":23,"pdf_page":28,"physical_index":28,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"857dbf2773f58d33c404a7cac27022b8bd0b641b0b38146e5afce12003efbc20"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"Leading platform firms that emerged from Silicon Valley’s high-technology ecosystem began to develop increasingly close ties with the US government during the war on terror after 2001 (Weiss, 2014; O’Mara, 2020). Their relationship encompasses both widespread government contracting and an emphasis on public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Weiss and Thurbon, 2020). Federal institutions such as the National Science Foundation, NASA, DARPA, the SBA, and National Labs dole out substantial funding in support of research and development that is critical to the US digital economy (Mazzucato, 2013; Wade, 2017; Tassinari, 2018). Despite this financial support, however, US techno-industrial policy remains relatively decentralized – and rather than directly intervening and ‘picking winners’, policy is designed to steer and support innovation. Allen et al. (2022, 22) describe this as a ‘large, decentralized apparatus for innovation within the US federal government, in which scores of agencies, often working in a largely uncoordinated fashion, engage with private firms to promote innovative breakthroughs in a wide array of sectors’. While each of these agencies has independent priorities, an underlying but emergent strategy is increasingly discernible. The US government seeks to safeguard the dominant position of its platforms worldwide, while progressively incorporating them into the militaryindustrial complex, because they possess unique attributes that, when mobilized, augment long-term geostrategic objectives.\n\nMilitary and national security interests consequently play an outsized role allocating funding in this uncoordinated funding environment. US capital markets continue to be the world’s largest and most liquid, accounting for around 40% of the world’s total equities (around four times that of China). Wall Street established powerful conduits in Silicon Valley VC during the 1990s and cemented the route to IPO via the NASDAQ, developing links between financial and tech capital have only grown in scope and scale since (Walker, 2006). Smaller tech firms enjoy uniquely abundant private capital markets, while Wall Street offers vast liquidity for IPOs or buyouts. But the influence of the US national security state looms large. Schwartz (2017, 327) describes it as a ‘vast technology enterprise spanning R&D, seed funding, commercialization, and both spin-off and spin-on of new technologies’. Private capital commonly follows in the wake ofbig bets placed on unlisted technology firms by the Department of Defense, since receiving funding from the US national security state (or one of its financial conduits) acts as a seal of approval for investors. These dynamics explain how, as Robinson (2020, 40) explains, the ‘Silicon Valley-Wall Street nexus becomes in turn interlocked with the militaryindustrial-security complex’.\n\nState Platform Capitalism\n\n23","previous_page":22,"next_page":24}