{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":28,"pdf_page":33,"physical_index":33,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"fdbb3ce11dd158b26827714830bddabcb7bc51bfb9be5647b777f5fa8fdf6f69"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"Fildes, 2020). While it impacted Huawei’s global operations, it failed to deal the Chinese firm a mortal blow. Huawei has since recovered and even strengthened its competitive position across a widening range of product categories and services. But despite mixed results, the Clean Network undeniably altered the course of US policy.\n\nThe Biden administration formally shelved the Clean Network Initiative, but it largely maintained and expanded the intent behind the Trump-era policy regarding technology diplomacy. The CHIPS Act,<sup>3</sup> the Biden administration’s flagship technology sector initiative subsidizing domestic semiconductor production, includes ‘strong guardrails, ensuring that recipients do not build certain facilities in China and other countries of concern’ (The White House, 2022a). These guardrails dovetail with a welter of new export controls aimed to starve Chinese platform giants of the advanced chips and manufacturing technologies necessary for their development of advanced networking equipment, smartphones, and AI (Ryan and Burman, 2024).\n\nWhile the business strategies ofUS tech firms were once premised on access to both the United States and China, the CHIPS Act and associated US policymaking increasingly forces firms to choose. Meta, Google, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft all recorded lobbying interest over the CHIPS Act (Bordelon and Oprysko, 2023) and have shown little hostility to other measures towards containing China’s technology sector. US platforms are, as observed, heavily limited their ability to do business in China, while they often regard the revenue loss from such measures as a price worth paying to damage Chinese competitors. Indeed, firms seem prepared to go beyond the letter of the law. In May 2024, Microsoft announced it was offering 700–800 members ofstaffat its flagship Research Asia AI centre in Beijing relocation to the United States and elsewhere (Huang and Kubota, 2024).\n\nIn addition to supporting domestic semiconductor production, the United States seeks to inhibit Chinese firms from securing strategic positions in an increasingly substantial portion of the global digital ecosystem. Perhaps most notably, Washington has signalled that it would like to establish a regional trade deal that would inhibit the operations ofChinese platforms, particularly in Asia. The much-vaunted Indo-Pacific Strategy unveiled in February 2022 committed the United States to:\n\n[P]romote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure, particularly cloud and telecommunications vendor diversity, including through innovative network architectures such as Open RAN by encouraging at-scale commercial deployments and cooperation on testing, such as through shared access to test beds to enable common standards development. We will also deepen shared resilience in critical government and infrastructure networks, while building new regional initiatives to improve collective cybersecurity and rapidly respond to cyber incidents. (The White House, 2022b, 17)\n\n28\n\nReinventing Capitalism\n\n<sup>3</sup> The full title is the CHIPS and Science Act 2022 (see: www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/ house-bill/4346/text).","previous_page":27,"next_page":29}