{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":45,"pdf_page":50,"physical_index":50,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"e24beed621d02ace24008785ce15f79c1aac9009af14e96e51bc41a5a4d970c6"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"2023). These formal and customary institutions underpin and reinforce dollar dominance and provide the United States with instruments to target and isolate geopolitical rivals. Even US allies such as the EU are not exempt from the long shadow cast by the US dollar, and they have little choice but to comply with US policy (de Goede, 2021).\n\nFor developing countries, the combined threat of vulnerability to dollar outflows, alongside the growing threats from Washington to weaponize the dollar, create strong incentives for targeted countries (including China) to bypass these systems. Countries directly targeted by US sanctions and financial power – including China – are eager to find an alternative to the dollar. Even US allies have expressed frustration with the dollar dominated financial system, because they are subject to ‘secondary sanctions’. The Russia-Ukraine war has substantially accelerated efforts to break dollar dominance, since the United States and European Union took exceptional measures to restrict Russia’s access to the global financial system, leveraged points of integration (including SWIFT) against it, and froze Russian dollar and euro deposits held by Western central banks.\n\nThese factors have given a major impetus to China’s efforts to construct an alternative monetary and financial architecture to the dollar (Choyleva, 2022). China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) – established in 2015 – provides an integrated alternative to the combined functions of SWIFT and CHIPS. It combines messaging services with clearing and settlement functions, largely bypassing the existing US-centric financial system (although the two remain interoperable) (Nölke, 2022). CIPS remains roughly 10% the size of SWIFT and CHIPS, but has grown very rapidly. In addition to promoting use of RMB in its bilateral trading relationships, China has also worked to denominate a growing range of assets (such as its abundant rare metals) and associated financial instruments in RMB (Liu, 2024c). To facilitate such efforts, China has built up RMB swap lines with over forty foreign central banks and made \\$500 bn worth ofRMB available to partners (McDowell, 2019; Steil et al., 2024). The RMB’s share of all trade financing remains at 7% of world total. However, the share of China’s own cross-border payments and receipts denominated in RMB hit a new peak of53% in 2024, with its use ofthe dollar to settle trades falling to just 43%. Not surprisingly, the RMB is used amongst China’s major trading partners to a considerable degree more than other countries. This has led the IMF to warn of ‘geoeconomic fragmentation into currency blocs (Gopinath, 2024).\n\nChina’s efforts to build an alternative to the US dollar system are interdependent with the digitalization and platformization of money. Digital tokens are increasingly issued by large platforms and circulate as forms of money. They offer real-time clearing capabilities, while their creators may gain unprecedented transaction-level data. Here, China has a strong first-mover advantage. Its principle private digital currencies (operated by Alibaba Pay and Tencent’s WeChat) already accounted for around \\$7 trillion of transactions in 2022. Their payments are cleared by the central bank’s Netsunion system, which captures detailed, real-time transaction data. The People’s Bank of China has also developed a central bank digital currency (CBDC), made interoperable with existing private digital currencies by political pressure (Kynge and Sun, 2021). For example, QR-code payment systems for e-CNY now function over Alipay. China’s public and private digital currencies appear set to become increasingly merged into the future.\n\nState Platform Capitalism\n\n45","previous_page":44,"next_page":46}