{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":47,"pdf_page":52,"physical_index":52,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1f8b08fe594a5c541cda0fe4bb12e7b1456831f7243c0152dd5327b04444343f"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"China’s attempts to undermine the hegemony of the US dollar are also hastening US innovation in this area. In response to both Chinese advances and the emergence of Diem (Meta’s ultimately failed digital currency), US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen initiated exploration of a US CBDC. Discussing the mooted FedCoin, the Federal Reserve (2024) states that ‘a CBDC would be the safest digital asset available to the general public, with no associated credit or liquidity risk’. Adoption of a CBDC, however, has been temporarily rejected by the second Trump administration, which favours the use of private cryptocurrencies. The United States prefers to mobilize the dollar’s existing global role by supporting its fintech platforms, which in turn offer it enormous surveillance power over global transactions. Payment platforms like Paypal and Venmo operate globally, building ‘rails’ between the dollar system in which they are rooted – where ‘real’ money flows and clears slowly – and the token-based currencies they issue and front (O’Dwyer, 2023). The spread of US-backed fintech firms vastly enhances its surveillance and sanctioning capabilities. Using the Bank Secrecy Act (1970), the Patriot Act (2001), and the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2020), US regulators – especially its powerful Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) – have virtually unrestricted access to transaction-level data from US platforms. The United States has been highly active in carving out global market access for its fintech firms (Jutel, 2021).\n\nUS-China rivalry in platform-based fintech and digital currencies initially had distinct implications for their conventional banking sectors. In the United States, traditional banks have broadly benefitted from fintech from the outset, partnering with platforms and tech giants to leverage digital payments and data analytics capabilities without significant displacement of incumbent power. In contrast, China’s state-dominated banking sector initially saw fintech giants (such as Ant Financial and Tencent) as threats, as they displaced existing payment infrastructures and lending functions. However, the technology sector crackdown and e-CNY rollout have served to partly reassert state control over financial infrastructure, and made the Chinese state more prepared to back its private digital currency expansion overseas. Thus, fintech rivalry has bolstered US banks through market-driven alliances, while stabilizing yet constraining China’s platforms through enforced collaboration and oversight from state banks. While the open global financial system continues to favour the dollar, its dominance may erode as China’s digital currency infrastructure grows, offering alternative trade and finance channels that reduce US leverage to punish or exclude rivals.\n\nState Platform Capitalism\n\n47","previous_page":46,"next_page":48}